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The literature on sentencing assumes a strong relationship between processing time and 
case outcomes, both directly and in connection with the mode of conviction. Yet, the role 
of time has largely been ignored in research on court actor decision making. The current 
study examines this important, although rarely empirically tested, dimension of the 
criminal justice process. By combining data from the Maryland State Commission on 
Criminal Sentencing Policy with information from court records, this study explores the 
effect of time to disposition on sentence severity and assess the impact that controlling 
for time to disposition has on mode of conviction effects. Findings support the 
importance of time to sentencing, demonstrating a significant, positive effect of time to 
disposition on sentence severity. Time to disposition, however, does not mediate the 
effects of mode of conviction, which raises important theoretical questions about the 
mechanisms driving trial penalties.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Time is important to all involved in the criminal justice process. It is often said 
that “justice delayed is justice denied”, a statement that is true for both victims and 
defendants. Victims of crime desire resolution of the injury incurred. For defendants, 
time spent in processing is itself a punishment, as the unconvicted face the possibility of 
pretrial detainment, attorneys’ fees, disruption of employment, damage to social 
relationships, and the psychological pain of uncertainty (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Zatz 
and Lizotte, 1985). To prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel, time is a scarce resource 
not to be squandered. It translates into efficiency in the disposition of cases, and is likely 
to be closely tied to the cost of a case (Zatz and Lizotte, 1985). Much of the literature on 
court actor behavior assumes that this shared goal of case processing efficiency directs 
the behavior of court actors such that decisions reflect more the mutual interests of 
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel than the ideals of justice or due process 
(Nardulli, 1978). This means that case outcomes may be understood, at least in part, as a 
product of the organizational resources associated with case processing time. 
This organizational efficiency perspective has been used to explain the “trial 
penalty,” the finding that offenders whose cases are disposed of by trial receive harsher 
sentences than similarly-situated offenders who plead guilty. The trial penalty (or plea 
reward, as it is sometimes referred to) is well documented in the literature on criminal 
sentencing, occurring in state (King et al., 2005) and federal courts (Ulmer, Eisenstein, 
and Johnson, 2010), across different types of offenders, including white-collar offenders 
(Albonetti, 1998), violent offenders (Ulmer and Bradley, 2006), less serious offenders 
(Kramer and Ulmer, 2009), drug offenders (Albonetti, 1997; Engen and Steen, 2000), and 
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terrorists (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Smith and Damphousse, 1998), and under 
sentencing guidelines systems (Engen et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003a; Johnson, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 2008; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Moore and Miethe, 1986). Its ubiquity has 
prompted several theoretical interpretations, one of which looks to time as the underlying 
mechanism. This prominent line of thinking posits that trials are generally undesirable to 
all members of the courtroom workgroup, since they require significant time and effort 
and are inherently uncertain events (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). Court actors’ common 
desire to avoid the inconvenience of a trial therefore leads to the development of an 
institutionalized sentencing practice whereby reduced sentences serve to induce offenders 
to “play the game” and plead guilty. This particular interpretation has been reflected in 
judges’ explicit invocation of time as a justification for the trial penalty – the “he takes 
some of my time, I take some of his” explanation (Uhlman and Walker, 1980: 324). 
Given its importance to theories of court actor behavior, the lack of research 
explicitly incorporating time into analyses of sentencing is surprising. Existing 
scholarship on the topic is limited to two studies, one conducted over twenty years ago 
and another that exclusively considers terrorist offenders. The present study aims to help 
fill this gap in the literature by empirically examining the role of time in sentencing 
outcomes, specifically, the effect of time to disposition on sentence severity. Not only is 
it necessary to provide empirical verification of an oft-assumed relationship, but this 
research is also consistent with Ulmer’s (2012) recent call for examinations of sentencing 
to be situated within the context of prior case processing. Until this point, most 
sentencing research has included case processing variables merely as controls in focusing 
on the influence of some other offender characteristic, such as race/ethnicity or gender. 
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Moreover, these case processing variables are often limited to mode of conviction 
(conceptualized as a simple plea/trial dichotomy) and to a lesser extent, type of counsel.  
Yet, case processing factors can be significant sources of disparity in sentencing, 
as they are often connected with offender characteristics. Just as researchers (e.g., 
Albonetti, 1990; Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch, 1981-82) have determined that net of other 
factors, Black offenders are less likely than White offenders to plead guilty, so too may 
there be racial/ethnic differences in case processing time (see, for example, Zatz and 
Lizotte [1985]). Race/ethnicity may thus indirectly affect sentencing outcomes through 
case processing time, if Black offenders have longer case processing times than White 
offenders and offenders whose cases take longer to dispose of are sentenced more 
severely. As Zatz (1987: 70) cautions, such an indirect effect “reflects more subtle 
institutionalized biases, but still falls within the purview of discrimination.” 
In addition to furthering knowledge on time as an important dimension of the 
sentencing process, this study also provides greater insight into the meaning of the trial 
penalty. Although sentencing disparity associated with the mode of conviction has largely 
been interpreted as driven by efficiency needs as previously described, it has also been 
cast in terms of substantive rationality. The substantive rationality perspective views the 
sentencing process in general as aiming to produce appropriately-tailored punishments 
within a system of strict, harsh laws (Rosett and Cressey, 1976; Savelsberg, 1992). From 
this competing viewpoint, pleading guilty may result in less severe sentences because an 
admission of guilt by the offender signifies acceptance of responsibility for the crime 
(Ulmer and Bradley, 2006). Similarly, the harsher sentencing of trial-convicted offenders 
may reflect the fact that “bad facts” about the offender or the crime are more likely to 
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come out during the course of a trial than in the plea-bargaining process (Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006).  
These two main interpretations of the trial penalty are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Nevertheless, each holds different implications for the notion of fairness in 
sentencing, since the organizational efficiency perspective in particular concedes that the 
punishment decision is influenced by factors beyond the offender’s control (Bradley-
Engen et al., 2012). The relevance of time to each theoretical explanation is different as 
well. That is, from the perspective of organizational efficiency, the trial penalty may be 
primarily construed as a time penalty (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012). Thus, examining time 
to disposition as a case processing variable, separate from the mode of conviction, is a 
potentially useful way of investigating the organizational efficiency and substantive 
rationality interpretations of the trial penalty. Previous research on the trial penalty has to 
a small extent attempted to empirically test its theoretical underpinnings by examining 
variation in plea/trial disparities (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; 
Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010). Disentangling time to disposition from the mode 
of conviction provides an alternative, novel avenue for making theoretical sense of the 
trial penalty. 
In order to examine the relationship among time to disposition, mode of 
conviction, and sentence severity, the present study utilizes thirteen years (1999 to 2012) 
of sentencing data from the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 
supplemented with information on case processing time obtained from Maryland 
Judiciary Case Search. In doing so, it makes several notable improvements to prior 
research. First, it uses a large sample of offenders convicted of a range of person, 
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property, and drug offenses, thus providing an estimate of the effect of time to disposition 
that applies to a broad population of offenders. Second, by utilizing data from Maryland, 
it conducts sentencing research in a relatively new context, as the majority of prior 
research on judicial decision making under sentencing guidelines has been limited to a 
select group of states (Kurlychek and Johnson, 2010). Third, it employs a more 
appropriate measure of disposition type that distinguishes between guilty pleas, bench 
trials, and jury trials to allow for a better understanding of sentencing disparities 
associated with the mode of conviction and the theoretical mechanisms that may account 
for these differences. And fourth, it makes use of Tobit regression to examine sentence 
severity, demonstrating its utility for capturing both the likelihood of incarceration and 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Research on criminal sentencing generally can be divided into studies of offender 
characteristics, studies of judge characteristics, and studies of court contexts (Johnson, 
2003b). Although more recent scholarship (e.g., Johnson, 2005, 2006; Johnson, Ulmer, 
and Kramer, 2008; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004) has emphasized the interrelatedness of 
these three areas and incorporated them simultaneously into multilevel analyses of 
sentencing outcomes, most of the sentencing literature falls singly within the first 
category. In examining the effect of individual-level factors on sentencing, this group of 
studies primarily focuses on the comparative influence of legally relevant versus legally 
irrelevant factors. Legally relevant factors are those that judges are legally authorized to 
take into consideration, such as the offender’s criminal history and the seriousness of the 
offense, whereas legally irrelevant factors are variables that either judges are legally 
prohibited from considering or have no rational relationship to the purposes of sentencing 
(Spohn, 2009). In this regard, much consideration has been given to the effects of 
race/ethnicity, gender, age, and their interaction (e.g., Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 
1998). There has been significantly less attention paid to case processing factors, which 
occupy a unique position due to their ambiguity as legitimate or illegitimate 
considerations in sentencing (King et al., 2005; Kramer and Ulmer, 2009). Three case 
processing variables in particular have been linked to sentencing outcomes: the mode of 
conviction (by plea or trial), the pretrial status of the defendant (whether released prior to 
disposition or detained in custody), and the type of defense representation (public 
defender or private attorney). While mode of conviction is the most frequently studied 
among the case processing variables, notably absent from this list is case processing time, 
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which is indirectly tied to the processing strategy. The present work therefore exists at the 
intersection of these two factors, differentiating between the mode of conviction and time 
to disposition in order to provide a better understanding of how each influences 
sentencing outcomes. Before proceeding, the extant literature on mode of conviction and 
time to disposition is discussed in detail as a framework for this investigation. 
Research on Mode of Conviction 
 Over the years, a substantial body of empirical research has accumulated on the 
effect of mode of conviction. Studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s mostly failed to 
find evidence of trial penalties. Eisenstein and Jacob (1977), in their seminal study of 
courtroom workgroups in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit felony courts, found that very 
little (between 3.3% and 10.9% for the decision to incarcerate and between 3.3% and 
7.2% for the length of sentence) of the variance in sentencing outcomes was accounted 
for by disposition mode. Based on this, the researchers concluded that the notion of the 
trial penalty is empirically false, although what actually matters in maintaining a steady 
flow of guilty pleas is the impression that guilty pleas are rewarded while trial-convicted 
defendants are penalized. Rhodes (1979) likewise argued that the benefits of plea 
bargaining are more of an illusion than a reality for defendants. Using data from 
Washington, D.C. on arrests for larceny, burglary, robbery, and assault, Rhodes (1979) 
estimated a model of the type of sentence received for defendants convicted at trial, 
which he then used to predict the sentence defendants who pled guilty would have 
received if they had gone to trial and lost. Comparing the predicted and actual sentences, 
Rhodes (1979) determined that in cases of assault, larceny, and burglary, defendants who 
pled guilty received sentences similar to what they would have received had they been 
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convicted at trial. He also found that defendants who pled guilty had roughly the same 
predicted rate of conviction at trial as defendants who went to trial, implying that those 
who plea-bargain are not necessarily “legally guiltier” than individuals who exercise their 
right to trial. Rhodes (1979) therefore concluded that more defendants should go to trial, 
since doing so allows for the possibility of acquittal without risking a more severe 
sentence.  
Brereton and Casper (1981-82), however, caution that the results of these two 
studies may be less conclusive regarding the existence of trial penalties than they appear. 
First, Brereton and Casper (1981-82: 52) argue that Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) are 
incorrect in rejecting the trial penalty hypothesis based on the small amount of variance 
explained by disposition mode, since the question is not whether mode of conviction is 
the major factor in sentencing decisions, but whether it makes a difference ceteris 
paribus. They also point out that in Rhodes’s (1979) analysis, individuals who pled guilty 
did receive sentencing concessions in robbery cases. Brereton and Casper (1981-82) note 
that sentencing differences between plea-bargained cases and trials may be more 
observable for serious offenses such as robbery, where the defendant, facing a greater 
potential punishment, has a greater incentive to go to trial with the hope that he or she 
will be acquitted. In such instances, a larger inducement will be needed for the defendant 
to plead guilty. 
Framing the issue in terms of selection bias, LaFree (1985) argued that the 
potential for acquittal may offset the greater penalty imposed on trial-convicted 
offenders, thereby making pleading guilty less of a bargain than implied by assessments 
that focus exclusively on convicted offenders. In line with his hypothesis, LaFree’s 
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(1985) analysis of robbery and burglary cases from six diverse jurisdictions in the United 
States showed consistently more severe sentences for guilty verdicts than for guilty pleas, 
although the effect of mode of conviction disappeared once cases that resulted in 
acquittal at trial were included in the analysis. Thus, LaFree (1985: 292) underscores that 
examination of the trial penalty involves two separate but related issues: first, whether 
defendants who plead guilty receive less severe sentences than defendants who are 
convicted at trial, and second, whether defendants who plead guilty receive less severe 
sentences than defendants who go to trial. Additional support for LaFree’s (1985) 
argument is provided by Smith (1986)’s study of felony burglary and robbery cases 
involving male defendants in New Orleans, Norfolk, Seattle, El Paso, Tucson, and 
Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Taking a similar approach to that of Rhodes (1979), 
Smith (1986) predicted the probability of incarceration for defendants who pled guilty if 
they had gone to trial, adjusting for the probability of conviction at trial. Comparison of 
the predicted probability of incarceration with the actual probability of incarceration for 
the plea-bargained cases showed a difference of only 3%. By contrast, Smith (1986) 
determined that comparing the proportion of defendants incarcerated after pleading guilty 
with the predicted proportion of these defendants who would have been incarcerated if 
they had proceeded to trial and been convicted would imply that pleading guilty was 
advantageous. Smith’s (1986) results are particularly compelling given that he was able 
to include in his estimates variables not typically available but recognized as important to 
sentencing outcomes, such as measures of evidentiary strength, the victim-offender 
relationship, and defendant drug and employment history.  
Interestingly, subsequent studies of selection bias in sentencing research suggest 
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exactly the opposite conclusion. Zatz and Hagan (1985) reported a significant effect of 
pleading guilty only when the sample of offenders included all cases sent for prosecution, 
compared to the same sample narrowed to convicted offenders. As a potential 
explanation for this discrepancy, Zatz and Hagan (1985) reasoned that selection bias may 
be more likely to conceal the effects of pleading guilty in certain jurisdictions, 
particularly those that employ determinate sentencing and thereby afford greater 
discretion to prosecutors. Similarly, in her analysis of felony cases in Washington, D.C., 
Albonetti (1991) found that failing to include a statistical correction for bias introduced 
from restricting the sample to convicted offenders substantially underestimated the effect 
of trial conviction on sentence severity. It should be noted, however, that Albonetti’s 
(1991) measure of sentence severity in this analysis, which rank ordered different 
sentence types into a single scale, means that her results should be interpreted with 
caution, as Blumstein et al. (1983) have discussed the problems inherent in attempting to 
capture the sentencing decision in this manner.   
Studies examining samples of convicted offenders more consistently support the 
notion that disposition mode is a meaningful factor in sentencing outcomes. Much of this 
research does not directly focus on the mode of conviction, but rather includes it as a 
control variable in analyses of sentencing. In one early study, Moore and Miethe (1986) 
tested the influence of various legally proscribed factors on sentencing outcomes in an 
effort to evaluate the effectiveness of Minnesota’s newly instituted sentencing guidelines. 
Despite the fact that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission specifically 
prohibited judges from taking into account whether the offender exercised his or her right 
to trial when determining sentences, the researchers found that conviction by trial 
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increased the length of incarceration ordered. Another study that examined the influence 
of gender on sentencing under Pennsylvania’s presumptive guidelines determined that 
mode of conviction had a significant effect on the judge’s decision to incarcerate as well 
as on sentence lengths (Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993). With regard to the 
incarceration decision, pleading guilty reduced the odds of each successive level of 
confinement, such that the overall odds of incarceration (jail or prison versus probation), 
the odds of prison versus jail or probation, and the odds of prison versus jail were lower 
for offenders who pled guilty (Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993). Similarly, 
Holleran and Spohn (2004), in arguing for the distinction between jail and prison in 
analyses of sentencing outcomes, found that conviction by trial increased the odds of 
receiving prison as opposed to probation as well as the odds of receiving prison as 
opposed to jail in Philadelphia. In their analysis of the influence of age, race, gender, and 
employment status on sentencing in three large urban jurisdictions, Spohn and Holleran 
(2000) found that pleading guilty reduced the odds of incarceration for offenders in two 
of the jurisdictions, Miami and Kansas City. Comparing the sentencing of juvenile and 
young adult offenders in adult criminal court, Kurlychek and Johnson (2004) reported a 
significant negative effect of jury trial conviction on sentence severity.  
 Similar results also appear in research on the impact of race/ethnicity on 
sentencing. Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch (1981-82) concluded that offenders who pled guilty 
were sentenced to incarceration less often, and that this, together with the fact that Blacks 
were less likely to plead guilty, may partially account for the harsher sentencing of 
Blacks compared to Whites (see also Albonetti [1990]). Investigating unwarranted 
racial/ethnic disparity under Maryland’s voluntary sentencing guidelines, Souryal and 
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Wellford (1997) found that offenders adjudicated by open plea, by negotiated plea, and 
by court trial were each less likely to be incarcerated and received shorter sentences than 
offenders adjudicated by jury trial. Furthermore, these effects were largely consistent 
across the three main crime categories of person, property, and drug offenses. In 
Washington State, Steen, Engen, and Gainey (2005) examined the sentencing of White 
and Black drug offenders, and found that pleading guilty decreased sentence lengths for 
both groups, although it exerted a significant effect on the odds of incarceration for White 
offenders only. And in the federal court system, Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) 
reported that going to trial resulted in a greater likelihood of imprisonment and longer 
sentence lengths across Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics in the case of both drug and 
nondrug offenses.  
An effect of mode of conviction has likewise been found for individuals convicted 
of specific types of crimes, suggesting that trial penalties are robust across diverse groups 
of offenders. Albonetti (1997), for instance, studied offenders convicted of simple drug 
possession or drug trafficking in federal court and found that pleading guilty reduced the 
probability as well as the length of imprisonment for offenders, although this effect was 
rather small compared to other factors. Relatedly, Engen and Steen (2000) determined 
that for first-time drug offenders in Washington State, irrespective of legislature-enacted 
reforms designed to constrain the discretion of the sentencing judge, trial-convicted 
offenders received more severe sentences and less favorable charging decisions than 
offenders who pled guilty. In a subsequent analysis of white-collar offenders (those 
convicted of money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, fraud, or larceny) sentenced 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Albonetti (1998) reported a significant, 
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“nontrivial” effect of the mode of conviction. Specifically, she found that pleading guilty 
produced a decrease in both the length of imprisonment for offenders sentenced to 
incarceration and the probability of imprisonment for offenders receiving a 
nonincarceration sentence . Smith and Damphousse (1998) focused on the sentencing of 
offenders indicted as a result of FBI investigations for “terrorism/terrorism-related” 
activities, finding a strong effect of pleading guilty on sentence length. They also 
concluded that compared to a matched sample of non-terrorists tried and convicted of 
“traditional crimes” in federal court, pleading guilty had a much larger impact for the 
terrorist offenders. Arguing that examining offenders convicted of serious crimes, with 
their accompanying higher trial rates, provides an ideal opportunity to study trial 
penalties, Ulmer and Bradley (2006) analyzed the effect of mode of conviction for violent 
offenders in Pennsylvania. The researchers reported that both conviction by court trial 
and conviction by jury trial increased the probability and length of incarceration, with 
court trial-convicted offenders faring substantially better than jury trial-convicted 
offenders. Kramer and Ulmer (2009) later extended this analysis to less serious offenders 
and found a similar pattern of trial penalties.  
The proliferation of sentencing guidelines in the federal court system and in many 
states has led to a shift in studies of sentencing. Sentencing guidelines aim to increase 
uniformity in sentencing and eliminate unwarranted disparity by instituting a return to 
formally rational judicial decision making whereby sentences are determined by an 
offender’s criminal history and the characteristics of the instant offense (Salvesberg, 
1992).  Yet, in actuality, formal rationality must coexist with substantive concerns 
(Ulmer and Kramer, 1996). A primary demonstration of this in the context of sentencing 
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is the judge’s decision to depart from the guidelines, as Kramer and Ulmer (2002) have 
argued that departures represent “corrections” to guidelines recommendations when there 
is a disjuncture between logically formal sentencing rules and local courtroom actors’ 
substantive concerns of sentencing.  In this regard, departures from sentencing guidelines 
allow for the exercise of judicial discretion and hence the possible reintroduction of 
unwarranted disparity (Johnson, 2003a). 
Consequently, researchers concerned with studying extralegal sentencing 
disparity have begun to recognize the importance of examining departure decisions as the 
outcome of interest. The literature on trial penalties is no exception, and suggests that 
disposition by trial is also associated with harsher sentencing outcomes through the 
differential use of guidelines departures for plea-bargained versus trial-convicted 
offenders. With regard to Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines, Moore and Miethe (1986) 
examined dispositional departures, which pertain to whether a sentence is stayed or 
executed, as well as durational departures, which concern the length of sentence, and 
found that offenders who were convicted by trial were significantly less likely to receive 
either a mitigated dispositional or mitigated durational departure from the guidelines. By 
contrast, the researchers did not find that the mode of conviction had an effect on the 
probability of receiving an aggravated dispositional or durational departure. A subsequent 
analysis of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines largely confirmed these findings, as 
Frase (1992-93) found that trial conviction decreased the probability of receiving a 
mitigated dispositional departure but had no influence on the probability of receiving an 
aggravated dispositional departure. Similarly, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) found that for 
serious violent offenders sentenced under Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines, 
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conviction by trial substantially lowered the odds of receiving a downward departure, 
compared to non-negotiated pleas. Johnson (2003a) also focused on Pennsylvania in 
comparing the effects of legal and extralegal factors on guidelines departures across 
different modes of conviction. Looking at overall differences between non-negotiated 
pleas, negotiated pleas, bench trials, and jury trials, he determined that conviction by jury 
trial decreased the odds of a downward departure and increased the odds of an upward 
departure, while conviction by bench trial decreased both the odds of a downward 
departure and the odds of an upward departure.  
In a similar vein, Engen et al. (2003) examined not only discretionary departures 
from Washington’s sentencing guidelines, but also the use of structured sentencing 
alternatives. They reasoned that since structured sentencing alternatives are another 
mechanism for sentencing below the standard range under Washington’s sentencing 
guidelines, the use of such sentencing alternatives may also produce unwarranted 
disparities. The results of their analysis supported this argument, underscoring the 
necessity of distinguishing between different mechanisms for departing from sentencing 
guidelines in examining the influence of extralegal factors. In particular, Engen et al. 
(2003) found that while pleading guilty increased the overall odds of a below-guidelines 
departure, this was primarily accounted for by the significant effect of pleading guilty on 
the odds of receiving the First Time Offender Waiver (FTOW) and the odds of receiving 
the Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA), two specific structured 
sentencing alternatives. Conversely, mode of conviction did not have a significant effect 
on the odds of receiving the Alternative Sentence Conversion or on the odds of a 
discretionary departure, whereby the judge may depart from the standard guidelines range 
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for “substantial and compelling” circumstances. It is also noteworthy that the FTOW and 
the SSOSA were treatment-focused, reflecting a rehabilitative philosophy. Thus, that 
pleading guilty had an effect only for these two mechanisms of departing from the 
guidelines may imply that such plea discounts are driven by the defendant’s signaled 
remorsefulness as indicating rehabilitative potential, as argued by Ulmer and Kramer 
(1996). 
Trial conviction appears to have a particularly significant effect on departures in 
the federal court system, where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines explicitly build in 
reasons for sentencing discounts that function as de facto plea rewards (Ulmer, 2005; 
Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010). Kempf-Leonard and Sample (2001) reported that 
for both male and female offenders, pleading guilty increased the odds of a downward 
departure from the guidelines by almost 12 times in the Eighth Circuit. In addition, 
Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008) concluded that trial conviction reduced the odds of a 
downward departure under Federal Rule 5K1.1, which is granted for offenders who have 
rendered “substantial assistance” to law enforcement, as well as the odds of a downward 
departure under Rule 5K2, which permits the judge to deviate from the guidelines if 
extenuating circumstances exist that were not sufficiently considered in determining the 
guidelines. With regard to the former type of departure, the researchers found that the 
effect of mode of conviction was immense, as trial-convicted offenders had almost no 
possibility of receiving a downward departure for providing substantial assistance. 
Furthermore, among offenders who received a downward departure under either Rule 
5K1.1 or 5K2, Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008) reported a significant effect of mode 
of conviction on the magnitude of the sentence reduction, with offenders convicted at 
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trial receiving sentence discounts that were 21% smaller on average in the case of 
substantial assistance departures and 12% smaller on average in the case of Rule 5K2 
departures.  
Analysis of sentencing guidelines departures also provides an opportunity to 
determine whether plea/trial sentencing differentials are more accurately characterized as 
plea discounts or trial penalties, as Kramer and Ulmer (2009) show. Although these terms 
are often used interchangeably in the sentencing literature, they convey subtle differences 
in meaning, particularly from a normative perspective. From their interviews with 
courtroom personnel, Ulmer and Kramer (1996: 395) provide examples of judges’ greater 
preference for the term “plea reward,” with one judge explicitly stating, “I choose not to 
call it a sentencing penalty.” Conceptualizing mode-of-conviction differences in this way 
may help assuage the uneasiness that accompanies the notion of penalizing the exercise 
of a constitutionally guaranteed right. In empirically assessing the appropriateness of the 
terms “plea discount” versus “trial penalty,” Kramer and Ulmer (2009) reasoned that in 
the case of plea discounts, one should observe sentences below the guidelines range for 
plea-bargained cases and sentences within the guidelines range for trials. By contrast, 
sentences for trial-convicted offenders should be above the guidelines range and 
sentences for offenders who pled guilty should be within the guidelines range if they are 
in fact trial penalties. Examining cases sentenced in Pennsylvania, Kramer and Ulmer 
(2009) found that trials were more likely to result in above-guidelines departures while 
guilty pleas were more likely to eventuate in sentences at or below the guidelines range, 
leading the researchers to conclude that these plea/trial sentencing differentials appear to 
be trial penalties. 
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Overwhelmingly, the majority of research on mode of conviction is concerned 
with the difference in sentencing outcomes between guilty pleas and trials. Yet, attention 
is increasingly being paid to potential differences among types of trials, namely bench (or 
court) trials and jury trials. This movement beyond the typical plea/trial dichotomization 
has been prompted by studies highlighting the fundamentally different processes 
underlying bench trials and jury trials and the inappropriateness of combining these two 
modes into a single category. In particular, Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) document how in 
certain jurisdictions, especially those in which features of the local court environment 
discouraged effective plea-bargaining, bench trials became the functional equivalent of a 
“slow plea.” The researchers note the practical benefit that bench trials offer all members 
of the courtroom workgroup, in that they take less time (approximately one to two hours, 
compared to a full day or more for a jury trial), require less preparation, and are marked 
by greater informality. Ulmer (1997) makes a similar observation, explaining that jury 
trials involve a more elaborate sentencing process whereby the judge learns more about 
the case and the defendant. Thus, whether due to saving the court time and effort or 
concealing bad facts about the defendant, there is reason to believe that bench trials may 
result in greater sentencing leniency than jury trials. This means that treating all trials as 
one homogeneous category may conceal the true benefit of pleading guilty, which is 
exactly what LaFree (1985) demonstrates. First comparing guilty pleas with only jury 
trials, and then comparing guilty pleas with all trials (both bench and jury), LaFree (1985) 
concluded that the effect of adjudication type on sentencing was substantially weaker 
when bench trials were included in the analysis.  
In accordance with LaFree’s (1985) findings, much research that separates bench 
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trials from jury trials shows that bench trial sentences are on average less severe than jury 
trial sentences, but more severe than sentences for guilty pleas. Souryal and Wellford 
(1997) found that compared to jury trials, bench trials resulted in reduced odds of 
incarceration and shorter sentence lengths, with the effect on sentence length being 
smaller than that of negotiated and non-negotiated pleas (with regard to the likelihood of 
incarceration, disposition by plea and by bench trial resulted in roughly the same 
reduction in odds). Similarly, using Pennsylvania sentencing data, Steffensmeier and 
Herbert (1999) reported a significant positive effect of disposition by bench trial on the 
length of sentence ordered that was smaller than the effect of disposition by jury trial. 
The researchers failed to find, however, an effect of bench trial conviction on the 
likelihood of incarceration. 
Other research on sentencing in Pennsylvania finds this relationship for both the 
in/out and sentence length decisions. Ulmer and Kramer (1996) determined that 
compared to non-negotiated pleas, disposition by bench trial increased the odds of 
receiving jail or prison time as opposed to probation as well as the odds of receiving 
prison time as opposed to probation or jail time, although the greater increase in odds 
resulted from disposition by jury trial. Furthermore, bench trial sentences of incarceration 
were on average 5.9 months longer than sentences of incarceration resulting from non-
negotiated pleas, whereas jury trial sentences were 16.3 months longer. More recently, 
Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that for serious violent offenders, the odds of 
incarceration following a bench trial were 2.2 times the odds for a guilty plea, while a 
jury trial conviction had roughly 2.7 times the incarceration odds of a guilty plea. This 
pattern was likewise found for sentence length, as the researchers concluded that 
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offenders found guilty by bench trial received longer sentences than those who pled 
guilty, but received shorter sentences than offenders convicted by jury trial. Kramer and 
Ulmer (2009) subsequently reported similar findings for offenders convicted of less 
serious crimes. Specifically, they found that while bench trials and jury trials increased 
both the odds of incarceration and incarceration length relative to pleading guilty, the 
penalty was most severe for jury trials compared to bench trials.  
Differences among guilty pleas, bench trials, and jury trials also appear in the 
context of sentencing guidelines departure decisions. Examining the use of downward 
departures for serious violent offenders in Pennsylvania, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) 
concluded that there were significant differences in the likelihood of a downward 
departure from the guidelines across the four modes of conviction of non-negotiated 
pleas, negotiated pleas, bench trials, and jury trials. In particular, they found that 
conviction by jury trial decreased the odds of a downward departure by the greatest 
amount, followed by conviction by bench trial. Johnson (2003a) examined the influence 
of mode of conviction on judges’ decisions to depart above and below Pennsylvania’s 
sentencing guidelines. Like Kramer and Ulmer (2002), he found that compared to 
pleading guilty, conviction by bench trial decreased the odds of a downward departure, 
although the greatest decrease in odds came from a jury trial conviction. Interestingly, 
Johnson (2003a) also found that conviction by bench trial actually decreased the odds of 
an upward departure from the guidelines more so than negotiating a plea did. He 
attributes this unexpected finding to a single county’s practice of using bench trials as 
“implicit pleas,” thereby underscoring that there is meaningful jurisdictional variation in 
bench trial usage.  
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Studies that examine sentencing in multiple states produce more equivocal results 
regarding the influence of bench trial conviction. King et al. (2005) analyzed differences 
in sentencing outcomes between guilty pleas, bench trials, and jury trials in Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Kansas, Washington, and Minnesota, five states that use sentencing 
guidelines. Consistent with other research, they found that bench trials resulted in odds of 
incarceration and sentence lengths that were greater than those for guilty pleas but less 
than those for jury trials in Maryland and Pennsylvania, the two states with less 
restrictive sentencing guidelines. In the remaining states, however, bench trial sentences 
followed a less predictable pattern. In Washington and Minnesota, King et al. (2005) 
found that for certain crimes, offenders who were convicted by bench trial were punished 
more severely than both offenders who pled guilty and those who were convicted by a 
jury. The remaining offenses in these two states and almost all offenses studied in Kansas 
exhibited no statistically significant effects for disposition by bench trial. To account for 
the harsher treatment of bench trial-convicted offenders compared to jury trial-convicted 
offenders in certain instances, the researchers argued that bench trials may draw more 
horrible crimes than jury trials. King et al. (2005) point to responses from interviews 
conducted with court actors suggesting that when the facts of a case are particularly 
egregious, the defense may push for a bench trial with the hope that a judge may be more 
objective than a jury. As additional support for this explanation, King et al. (2005) found 
that the offenses where incendiary facts are most likely – sexual offense and aggravated 
assault cases – had the highest proportion of bench trials compared to the other offense 
types. 
Also drawing from a multi-state sample of cases, Weidner, Frase, and Shultz 
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(2005) utilized the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ State Court Processing Statistics dataset 
in analyzing jurisdictional variation in the effects of various individual- and county-level 
characteristics on the probability of incarceration. The researchers considered the effect 
of mode of conviction, and like Johnson (2003a), cast doubt on whether bench trials 
consistently result in greater sentence severity than pleading guilty. In particular, 
Weidner, Frase, and Shultz (2005) found that offenders who were convicted by bench 
trial were approximately half as likely to receive a prison sentence as those who pleaded 
guilty, although they acknowledged the possibility that this unexpected finding may be 
due to some unobserved factor that is highly correlated with bench trial conviction.  
The effect of bench trial conviction on sentence severity is thus more qualified 
than that of jury trial conviction. Important in this regard, however, is that there is great 
variability in what bench trials represent and how they are used across courtrooms 
(Schulhofer, 1984). As King et al. (2005: 968) remarked, “compared to plea bargains or 
jury trials, relatively little is known about bench trials generally” [emphasis added]. This 
variation is evident not only from the interviews conducted by King et al. (2005), but 
from other accounts of bench trials as well. In contrast to Eisenstein and Jacob’s (1977) 
and Johnson’s (2003a) descriptions of bench trials serving as slow pleas in Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, respectively, Wright and Miller (2002), for example, note that bench trials 
in New Orleans did not involve sentence negotiations. Therefore, the lack of a consistent 
effect of bench trial conviction among studies that examine different jurisdictions or 
different offenses is somewhat unsurprising, as variation in bench trial processes means 
that the implications of a bench trial conviction for the sentence outcome may also vary.  
Moving beyond the question of whether trial penalties exist, a few studies seek to 
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improve understanding of trial penalties by examining how they vary. This variation has 
been studied across both individual- and county-level factors. Consistent with the 
considerable attention that has been devoted to racial/ethnic and gender disparity in 
sentencing, on the individual level, scholars have focused primarily on racial/ethnic and 
gender differences in trial penalties. With regard to gender, Steffensmeier, Kramer, and 
Streifel (1993) reported that in Pennsylvania, the effect of trial conviction on the 
likelihood of incarceration and sentence length was approximately the same for male and 
female offenders. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) reported similar results for serious violent 
offenders in Pennsylvania, as they failed to find a statistically significant difference in the 
jury trial penalty between men and women for either the incarceration or sentence length 
decision. In the federal court system, Albonetti (1998) found that the trial penalty did not 
vary according to gender for white-collar offenders. Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson 
(2010) reached the same conclusion using a general sample of offenders. While the 
gender of the offender thus does not seem to influence the size of the trial penalty, there 
is limited evidence that the gender of the sentencing judge does matter. Examining 
whether male and female judges in Pennsylvania differed in the weight they gave to 
certain sentencing criteria, Steffensmeier and Herbert (1999) found a significant 
interaction effect between the gender of the judge and mode of conviction on sentence 
length, with female judges giving harsher jury trial penalties than male judges. 
In contrast to the literature on gender, research on race/ethnicity and the trial 
penalty for the most part finds significant interaction effects. These findings are 
consistent with Spohn’s (2009: 188) observation that “the combination of race or 
ethnicity and other legally irrelevant characteristics produces greater disparity than race 
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or ethnicity alone.” Zatz (1984), in examining felony offenders sentenced under 
California’s determinate sentencing laws, found that Hispanics were particularly 
disadvantaged, with sentence reductions from pleas of guilty and slow pleas (also called 
“conviction by transcript”) being significantly shorter for Hispanics than for Blacks and 
Whites. Steen, Engen, and Gainey (2005) investigated racial differences in various 
determinants of sentencing in Washington State and found that pleading guilty produced 
larger reductions in the length of incarceration for Whites than it did for Blacks. In their 
study of offenders in the U.S. district courts, Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000) reported 
significant differences in trial penalties between White, Black, and Hispanic offenders in 
terms of sentence length. The researchers determined that trial penalties were smallest for 
Whites across all offenses, while they were largest for Blacks in the case of drug offenses 
and for Hispanics in the case of nondrug offenses. In addition, Johnson (2003a) found 
that mode of conviction conditioned racial/ethnic disparity, specifically that Blacks 
relative to Whites were less likely to receive downward departures from the guidelines if 
they were convicted by trial.   
Not all studies find that trials exacerbate racial/ethnic disparity in sentencing, 
however. Albonetti (1997) reported no difference in the effect of pleading guilty across 
White, Black, and Hispanic drug offenders in the federal court system, which led her to 
conclude that guilty plea negotiations were not a mechanism through which racial/ethnic 
disparity was introduced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Similarly, Ulmer and 
Bradley (2006) initially found an interaction between race and jury trial conviction for 
serious violent offenders in Pennsylvania, but this effect disappeared once they controlled 
for the interaction between mode of conviction and the percentage Black in the county. 
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Finally, although Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) found that race interacted with 
mode of conviction to influence sentence length, they determined that Whites actually 
faced a more severe trial penalty than Blacks.  
Trial penalties have also been found to vary according to legally relevant offender 
characteristics, namely criminal history and offense severity. Contrary to expectations, 
Ulmer and Bradley (2006) determined that both the likelihood of incarceration and 
sentence length following conviction by jury trial decreased as an offender’s Prior Record 
Score under the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines increased. Among offenders 
convicted of less serious offenses, Kramer and Ulmer (2009) likewise reported that 
increases in the Prior Record Score substantially decreased the incarceration trial penalty. 
Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) found that in the federal court system as well, 
trial-convicted offenders with more serious criminal histories experienced less severe trial 
penalties, although the effect was more modest. The opposite pattern appears to hold for 
offense severity. For offenders convicted of violent offenses as well as those convicted of 
lesser crimes, increases in the Offense Gravity Score under the Pennsylvania sentencing 
guidelines led to more severe trial penalties (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006). Relatedly, Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) found that more severe 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines recommendations were associated with increased trial 
penalties, an effect which they argued was likely driven by offense severity.  
Research on contextual variation in trial penalties is based on the premise that as 
distinct social worlds (Ulmer, 1997), courts possess organizational cultures that 
differentially shape case processing and sentencing norms. Included among these norms 
are those concerning trials, and thus the practice of penalizing offenders who exercise 
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their right to trial is likely to vary among courts (Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010). 
These studies predominantly examine the impact of local court context on trial penalties 
by focusing on variation according to county-level characteristics, as this approach 
attempts to determine not only whether jurisdictions vary in their use of trial penalties, 
but also why (Johnson, 2003b). By far the most commonly studied characteristic in this 
respect is caseload pressure. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) determined that in Pennsylvania, 
higher caseload pressure increased the trial penalty in relation to the odds of 
incarceration; however, it did not influence the trial effect for the sentence length 
decision. Ulmer and Bradley (2006), using a sample of serious violent offenders in 
Pennsylvania, also found that caseload pressure conditioned the effect of trial conviction, 
although for the length of sentence only. In the U.S. district courts, Johnson, Ulmer, and 
Kramer (2008) found that increases in court caseloads further decreased the odds of a 
downward departure following trial conviction, while Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson 
(2010) found that caseload pressure increased the effect of trial conviction on sentence 
length.  
The impact of county trial rates on trial penalties has also been examined, with 
researchers reaching differing conclusions. Whereas studies by Ulmer and Johnson 
(2004) and Kramer and Ulmer (2009) conducted in Pennsylvania found that the size of 
the trial penalty did not depend on the trial rate, Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) 
reported that higher trial rates were associated with smaller trial penalties in the federal 
court system. Although this might suggest that counties with higher trial rates are more 
tolerant of trials and thus less likely to penalize defendants for going to trial, Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) caution that the relationship is likely reciprocal. In 
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particular, they note that defendants may be more inclined to go to trial when there is less 
of a penalty for doing so.  
Several other county-level factors have been explored in relation to trial penalties, 
albeit to a lesser extent. In particular, Dixon (1995) compared courts of differing levels of 
judicial and prosecutorial bureaucratization in Minnesota and found evidence of a trial 
penalty only in jurisdictions with high levels of bureaucratization. Kautt (2002) found 
that trial penalties were greater in district courts that had higher rates of granting 
substantial assistance departures, which is consistent with Ulmer, Eisenstein, and 
Johnson’s (2010) finding that substantial assistance departures under Rule 5K1 accounted 
for a substantial portion of the trial effect in the federal courts. Additionally, Ulmer and 
Bradley (2006) concluded that the percentage Black in the county, the violent crime rate, 
and the size of the jurisdiction exerted significant effects on the jury trial penalty for 
sentence length. Kramer and Ulmer’s (2009) results for less serious offenders mostly 
mirror those of Ulmer and Bradley (2006), as they reported more severe effects for trial 
conviction in larger, urban jurisdictions and in jurisdictions with higher Black 
populations.  
Such findings about variation in the effect of mode of conviction are useful in that 
they provide information on the underlying meaning of trial penalties. This is 
demonstrated by Kramer and Ulmer (2009), Ulmer and Bradley (2006), and Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010), who link variation in trial penalties along certain factors 
to specific theoretical explanations. These researchers situate plea/trial sentencing 
differentials within substantive rationality and organizational efficiency interpretations of 
sentencing behavior, hypothesizing that trial penalties may be motivated by attributions 
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about the culpability of and danger posed by the offender in addition to the organizational 
need for efficient case processing. Empirically testing for variation in trial penalties along 
certain individual- and county-level factors, then, offers evidence regarding the salience 
of these explanations of the trial penalty.  
In particular, Kramer and Ulmer (2009), Ulmer and Bradley (2006), and Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) tie individual-level variation in trial penalties to the 
substantive rationality perspective, arguing that offender characteristics may influence 
judges’ perceptions of offender blameworthiness and dangerousness that result in more or 
less severe trial penalties. Evidence of trial penalty variation along such offender 
characteristics therefore supports the notion that trial penalties are motivated by 
substantive concerns about the blameworthiness and dangerousness of the offender. 
Relevant in this regard are findings of racial/ethnic disparity in trial penalties, as Kramer 
and Ulmer (2009) explain that minorities may be perceived as more dangerous than 
Whites, which may in turn account for their greater trial penalties. Similarly, the 
researchers underscore findings that trial penalties increased with offense severity, 
reasoning that trials may provide an opportunity for offenders to be portrayed as more 
blameworthy or dangerous.  
On the other hand, scholars (e.g., Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008; Kramer and 
Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010) point to 
findings of variation in trial penalties according to caseload pressure as support for the 
organizational efficiency interpretation of the trial penalty. Ulmer and Bradley (2006), for 
instance, reason that if the need to keep cases moving efficiently is the driving force 
behind trial penalties, then the stakes should be higher, and trial penalties should be 
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greater, as court caseloads increase. Yet, they also suggest that persisting variation in trial 
penalties even after caseload pressure is taken to account implies that organizational 
efficiency is not the main reason for trial penalties. This may not necessarily be the case, 
however, as there has been debate (see Nardulli, 1978) as to whether courtroom actors’ 
interest in efficient case disposition is the result of caseload pressure. If that is true, then 
focusing on caseload pressure may not be the most appropriate way to examine the merit 
of the organizational efficiency explanation of the trial penalty.    
Given this potential limitation, two other studies are helpful in considering the 
organizational efficiency interpretation of the trial penalty. Rather than testing for 
variation in the effect of trial conviction by caseload pressure, Zatz (1984) examined the 
effect on sentence length of several modes of conviction ranging in efficiency, from a 
plea of nolo contendere (no contest) to conviction by jury. Consistent with the 
organizational efficiency perspective, she concluded that those methods that saved the 
court the most time were rewarded with the shortest prison terms, as compared to a jury 
trial conviction, pleading nolo contendere was associated with the largest decrease in 
sentence length, followed by an initial plea of guilty, a change of plea to guilty, 
conviction by transcript, and finally, conviction by the court. Yet, research by LaFree 
(1985) calls these findings into question, as his results suggest that, among offenders who 
plead guilty, when the plea is entered does not impact sentencing leniency. Specifically, 
he found that regardless of the level of prosecutorial control in a jurisdiction, whether the 
offender pled guilty at the first formal opportunity had no effect on sentence severity.    
Research on Case Processing Time 
 At present, only two studies have explicitly incorporated time to disposition in 
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analyses of sentencing. The first, by Zatz and Hagan (1985), did so as part of a larger 
examination of selection bias in sentencing research. The primary aim of the researchers 
was to demonstrate that, since the sentencing outcome represents the culmination of a 
long chain of prior processing decisions, estimates of the effects of certain predictors are 
biased when only cases reaching later stages in the process are included in the analysis. 
Using three years of felony arrest data from California, Zatz and Hagan (1985) specified 
three separate models of sentence length that incorporated offense, offender, and case 
processing factors, including time to disposition. Each model used a different selection 
criterion for the same sample, such that the samples included all cases sent to the 
prosecutor, cases resulting in conviction, and cases resulting in incarceration. By 
comparing results across models, Zatz and Hagan (1985) concluded that excluding 
censored observations generally resulted in biased parameter estimates. Furthermore, in 
examining the effects of the specific study variables, the researchers found that the 
number of days between arrest and case disposition had a significant effect on sentence 
length, and that the size of the effect was largely invariant across all three samples. 
Notably, longer processing times resulted in shorter sentences of incarceration, although 
Zatz and Hagan (1985) acknowledged that this may be due to time served in pretrial 
detention being counted toward sentence length. 
 More recently, Bradley-Engen et al. (2012) examined the effect of time to 
conviction on sentence length specifically in regard to the plea/trial disparity. They found 
not only that time to conviction had a significant, positive effect on sentence length, but 
that including a measure of processing time substantially decreased the effect of mode of 
conviction. The researchers interpreted this latter finding as evidence in support of the 
31 
 
organizational efficiency explanation of the trial penalty, although they argued that the 
remaining significance of trial disposition, with time to conviction controlled, implies an 
additional mechanism at work in the trial penalty. Bradley-Engen et al. (2012) also found 
a significant interaction effect between time to conviction and mode of conviction, in that 
processing time had a greater positive effect on sentence length for trial-convicted 
offenders than for offenders who pled guilty. While the researchers argued that this 
interaction effect lacks a clear theoretical interpretation, their result is consistent with 
conclusions by Zatz and Hagan (1985) and Flemming, Nardulli, and Eisenstein (1987) 
that trial time is kept to a minimum relative to other processing time because it is 
considered more costly to court actors. Methodological limitations of Bradley-Engen et 
al.’s (2012) study, however, call into question the validity of these findings. In particular, 
they conducted their analysis using cases sentenced in federal court for charges resulting 
from FBI investigations for terrorism-related activities, which is problematic given that 
Smith and Damphousse (1998) determined that the magnitudes of various predictors of 
sentence length, especially the mode of conviction, significantly differed for “traditional” 
offenders compared to terrorist offenders. Additionally, Bradley-Engen et al. (2012) used 
ordinary least-squares regression as their method of analysis, making no correction for 
selection bias introduced from restricting the study sample to cases that received 
sentences of incarceration. 
Summary 
Overall, the significant amount of research on mode of conviction supports the 
conventional wisdom of many courtroom participants that defendants who exercise their 
right to trial and lose will be penalized. This “trial tax” is pervasive, as it has been found 
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to operate in the federal and state courts, among different types of offenders, and under 
sentencing guidelines systems. Moreover, prior research indicates that trial penalties are 
not evenly assessed, but vary according to offender characteristics and court contextual 
features. Yet, when mode of conviction is disaggregated beyond simply guilty pleas and 
trials, the findings become more complex, as inconsistencies exist in the literature 
regarding the effect that bench trial conviction has on sentencing outcomes. This is likely 
due to variation in bench trial processes, and thus it is important that research examine 
differences among guilty pleas, bench trials, and jury trials in new contexts in order to 
develop a more complete picture of mode of conviction effects. Furthermore, despite the 
amount of attention that has been devoted to the topic, relatively little is still known about 
the theoretical mechanisms that underlie trial penalties. While several studies provide 
limited evidence about possible explanations for trial penalties, few, if any, are directly 
concerned with uncovering their meaning.  
In contrast to mode of conviction, the effect of case processing time has received 
scant attention in the sentencing literature, and what little research there is on the subject 
is divided. While time to disposition appears to influence sentencing outcomes, less clear 
is whether a longer processing time serves to increase or decrease sentence severity. 
Findings are also tentative regarding the impact that including time to disposition in 
models of sentencing has on the relative influence of mode of conviction. These issues 
may be attributable to the limitations of prior research. Specifically, Zatz and Hagan’s 
(1985) inability to distinguish credited pretrial detention time from post-sentencing 
incarceration makes it difficult to interpret their finding of a negative relationship 
between case processing time and sentence length, as it is possible that the observed 
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effect is due to time served in pretrial detention being counted toward sentence length. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the persistent effect of mode of conviction when 
processing time is controlled primarily reflects the particularly large trial penalty for 
terrorist offenders. Clearly, additional research is needed for a better understanding of the 
effect of case processing time, the meaning of trial penalties, and the ways in which the 
two interact to influence sentence outcomes. The current study does not claim to fully 





CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 The conceptual approach of this study is grounded in the organizational efficiency 
theoretical perspective of court actor behavior.1 This perspective holds that courts are 
primarily driven by the operational goal of efficient case processing, to the detriment of 
formal legal or political goals (Dixon, 1995). According to the organizational efficiency 
perspective, prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel share a common interest in 
disposing of cases, which thereby results in the development of institutionalized case 
processing strategies designed to expedite the movement of cases through the system 
(Dixon, 1995). This approach not only suggests the differential sentencing of guilty pleas, 
bench trials, and jury trials as a means to induce more efficient modes of disposition, but 
also implies that case processing time itself, as a factor immediately tied to efficiency 
concerns, may have a strong effect on sentence outcomes. The following chapter 
discusses the organizational efficiency perspective in detail and draws upon that 
theoretical framework in addition to prior research in developing several hypotheses 
regarding the effects of case processing time and mode of conviction on sentencing.   
The Organizational Efficiency Perspective 
 The organizational efficiency perspective of court actor behavior has been traced 
to “Michels’ law.” As Dixon (1995: 1162) explains, “[a]ccording to Michels (1915), the 
imperatives of organizational maintenance deflect the system from the pursuit of formal 
rational goals and result in the development of operating goals by organizational elites.” 
Applied to the criminal justice process, Michels’ law implies that courts are organized 
                                                          
1 While the organizational efficiency perspective is not considered a theory, it is useful in that it identifies a 
motivation underlying decision making by court actors. The lack of theory to explain criminal justice 
processes has been noted by several scholars (e.g., Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2003b; Ulmer, 2012).     
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according to an organizational maintenance process created by courtroom elites (Dixon, 
1995). The “courtroom elite” consists of prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel, who 
have almost unfettered power in the handling of criminal court cases (Nardulli, 1978). 
Nardulli (1978) argues that the power of the courtroom elite emanates from the low 
visibility of and difficulty in evaluating its decisions, combined with the fact that legally 
it is vested with the responsibility for the majority of the vital tasks involved in 
processing criminal cases, such as initiating and dismissing charges, making and ruling 
on legal motions, ruling on guilt or innocence, and sentencing. In contrast to other players 
in the courtroom setting, the power of the courtroom elite enables it to effectuate its 
interests (Nardulli, 1978). 
Based on the conception of courts as organizations (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; 
Nardulli, 1978), the courtroom elite is characterized by the interdependence among its 
members and the informal, cooperative relations that develop as a result. The coalition 
among the courtroom elite is shaped by their mutual interests, as Nardulli (1978: 71) 
explains, “these interests define the common ground upon which cooperative relations 
can be based.” According to the organizational efficiency perspective, the most important 
of these shared interests is the efficient processing of cases, which each member of the 
courtroom elite desires for a different reason. For judges and prosecutors, high 
disposition rates communicate efficiency and accomplishment in their craft (Eisenstein 
and Jacob, 1977; Flemming, Nardulli, and Eisenstein, 1992). Furthermore, prosecutors 
benefit from speedy case dispositions because as cases draw on, evidence from witnesses 
becomes less reliable, thereby lessening the chance of securing a conviction (Eisenstein 
and Jacob, 1977). The motivation for defense counsel depends upon their status as either 
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public defenders or private attorneys. Public defenders responsible for representing 
indigent defendants have an overwhelming amount of clients, and quick case dispositions 
allow them additional time to devote to other cases (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Nardulli, 
1978). On the other hand, private defense attorneys have a particular financial incentive 
to expeditiously process cases. Most private defense attorneys are paid on a case-by-case 
basis, and since most clients can barely afford even moderate fees, these attorneys must 
depend on a high turnover with a minimal expenditure of effort in order to be financially 
profitable (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Nardulli, 1978). While other motivations for case 
processing efficiency among the courtroom elite, namely caseload pressure, have also 
been ventured (see Blumberg [1967]), most important for the organizational efficiency 
perspective is the premise that it is in the interests of each to process cases expeditiously. 
For all members of the courtroom elite, an additional aspect of criminal court 
work – their perception of their work – reinforces their interest in efficient case 
disposition and its impact on court operations. Court actors’ perceptions of their work is 
primarily shaped by the presumption of guilt, which Nardulli (1978) describes as the 
shared belief that weak cases are screened out at an earlier stage of the criminal justice 
process, and thus the cases that remain to be dealt with by the system are those for which 
there is no serious dispute regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The 
presumption of guilt has significant consequences for the courtroom elite’s perception of 
its work in that prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel come to view themselves as 
merely responsible for deciding what to do with defendants who are guilty (Nardulli, 
1978). This perception orients the courtroom elite away from the ideal of doing justice 
and toward managing a mundane, routinized process, where the focus is on the means 
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rather than the ends.  
The common interest of the courtroom elite in efficiently disposing of cases, as 
well as the courtroom elite’s power to effectuate its interests, leads to important 
implications for the operations of criminal courts (Nardulli, 1978). In particular, out of 
the cooperative relations of the courtroom elite develop informal case processing 
strategies that are intended to ensure the smooth, efficient disposition of cases (Dixon, 
1995). Johnson (2003b) explains that over time, these strategies become part of the case 
processing norms of the courtroom elite, norms which consequently become embedded in 
the court culture. The classic instance of a case processing strategy theorized to have 
developed in response to the goal of organizational efficiency is the practice of plea 
bargaining, with the court rewarding defendants who plead guilty and penalizing those 
who go to trial. Guilty pleas allow members of the courtroom elite to dispose of cases 
with minimal effort (Dixon, 1995), where by contrast, trials use valuable court time and 
resources, are disruptive of normal working relationships among the courtroom elite, and 
introduce uncertainty (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Flemming, Nardulli, and Eisenstein, 
1992).  Thus, the informal policy of more severely sentencing offenders who exercise 
their right to trial serves to encourage guilty pleas as a way of maintaining an orderly, 
efficient system.  
The organizational efficiency perspective is primarily supported by qualitative 
evidence from prior research (e.g., King et al., 2005; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Uhlman 
and Walker, 1980; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010), as 
interviews with prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel explicitly point to efficient case 
disposition as a common rationale for court actor behavior. As a particularly noteworthy 
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example, Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) surveyed federal judges and found that 
34% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “efficient case 
processing is an end in itself.” Quantitative studies of sentencing likewise lend credence 
to this perspective. Dixon (1995), finding a strong effect of pleading guilty in models of 
imprisonment and sentence length under conditions of high prosecutorial and judicial 
bureaucratization, concluded that sentencing reflects organizational maintenance 
processes in at least certain contexts. Furthermore, Engen and Steen (2000) determined 
that the impact of sentencing reforms designed to increase sentence severity depended on 
the mode of conviction, based on which they concluded that it is largely organizational 
efficiency concerns that drive sentencing practices. 
Hypotheses of Time and Mode of Conviction Effects 
If, according to the organizational efficiency perspective, courts seek to 
discourage time-consuming trials by imposing harsher sentences on offenders who are 
convicted at trial, then one would expect to observe significant differences in sentences 
between guilty pleas and trials. This disparity should be especially pronounced for 
offenders who exercise their right to trial by jury, given that jury trials require the most 
preparation, take the most time, and are the most elaborate among the possible modes of 
conviction (Brereton and Casper, 1982; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Ulmer and Bradley, 
2006). The consistent finding of a positive effect of jury trial conviction on sentence 
severity in prior literature (e.g., Johnson, 2003a; King et al., 2005; Kramer and Ulmer, 
2002, 2009; Souryal and Wellford, 1997; Steffensmeier and Herbert, 1999; Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Zatz, 1984) further supports this expectation.  
Hypothesis 1: Offenders convicted by jury trial will receive more severe sentences 
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than offenders convicted by guilty plea. 
The organizational efficiency perspective also implies that bench trials should be 
afforded greater sentencing leniency than jury trials, but less sentencing leniency than 
guilty pleas. Compared to jury trials, bench trials consume fewer organizational resources 
in that they are significantly shorter and more informal, thereby requiring less preparation 
(Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; Schulhofer, 1984). Yet, it is reasonable that bench trials still 
represent an increase in organizational cost over pleading guilty. Indeed, the very 
description of bench trials as “slow pleas” in much of the literature (e.g., Eisenstein and 
Jacob, 1977; Johnson, 2003a; Schulhofer, 1984; Zatz, 1984) directly suggests that they 
are less efficient than plea-bargaining in that they are a “slower, more drawn out manner 
of pleading guilty” (Levin, 1977: 80). Prior research by King et al. (2005) and Souryal 
and Wellford (1997) supports this hypothesis, as both studies reported effects for bench 
trial conviction that fell in between those for guilty plea conviction and jury trial 
conviction for offenders sentenced in Maryland’s circuit courts. 
Hypothesis 2: Offenders convicted by bench trial will receive more lenient 
sentences than offenders convicted by jury trial, but will receive more severe 
sentences than offenders convicted by guilty plea. 
While the organizational efficiency perspective is most commonly invoked to 
explain differences in sentencing outcomes between guilty pleas and trials, this 
perspective suggests that potentially any factor that impedes efficiency goals may 
influence sentencing (Johnson, 2003b). In the most basic sense, efficiency refers to time. 
As a scarce resource, the time required to dispose of a case is directly related to its 
organizational cost (Zatz and Lizotte, 1985). By the logic of the organizational efficiency 
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perspective, then, which generally views sentencing as a function of the organizational 
resources invested (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012), disposition time itself should have a 
direct effect on sentence severity. Just as the court punishes defendants who insist on 
exercising their right to trial, so too may an incentive structure exist to discourage 
defendants from prolonging a case and taking up the court’s valuable time, regardless of 
the way in which the case is adjudicated. Although the time it takes to dispose of a case 
may also be influenced by factors beyond the defendant’s willingness to cooperate, from 
the perspective of court actors, delay due to other reasons is likely to be minor compared 
to that believed to be caused by the defendant, who has the ability to plead guilty at 
almost any point during the process. Zatz and Lizotte (1985) emphasize the many ways in 
which a defendant can slow case processing, explaining that a defendant who has 
information to give in return for a more lenient sentence may hold out on a plea deal in 
order to obtain a better bargain. Moreover, a defendant facing a potentially harsh 
sentence may attempt to drag out a trial in the hopes of dismissal due to loss of witnesses, 
evidence, and media interest over time (Zatz and Lizotte, 1985). Although prior research 
on time to disposition (e.g., Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Zatz and Hagan, 1985) is split 
regarding the directionality of the effect, the above rationale expects time to disposition 
to positively impact sentence severity.  
Hypothesis 3: Offenders whose cases take more time to disposition will receive 
more severe sentences than offenders whose cases take less time to disposition. 
The preceding argument necessitates an additional hypothesis. If time to 
disposition has a direct effect on sentencing outcomes, then it should also mediate 
sentence differences between guilty pleas and trials, given that trials generally take longer 
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than guilty plea convictions (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012). Whether and how much of the 
plea-trial disparity is accounted for by time to disposition therefore depends upon the 
underlying rationale for trial penalties. While this study relies upon the organizational 
efficiency perspective to explain trial penalties, an alternative interpretation views plea-
trial sentencing differences as largely a result of substantively rational decision making. 
In line with this perspective, recent research on trial penalties has drawn from focal 
concerns theory. Focal concerns theory posits that judges base their sentencing decisions 
on three focal concerns: offender blameworthiness, community protection/offender 
dangerousness, and practical constraints (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). In 
the face of limited information and uncertainty, judges make assessments of these focal 
concerns that are colored by attributions about the offender (Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 1998). When this theory is applied to trial penalties, it suggests that pleading 
guilty versus being convicted at trial may provide certain information about an offender 
that influences the judge’s assessments of blameworthiness and dangerousness (Ulmer, 
Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010). Consequently, a large trial penalty even when taking into 
consideration time to disposition would imply that reasons other than efficiency, such as 
the substantively rational concerns of offender dangerousness and blameworthiness 
posited by focal concerns theory, are responsible for the harsher sentencing of trial-
convicted offenders. On the other hand, if it is organizational maintenance processes that 
primarily motivate trial penalties, then time to disposition should account for all but a 
small portion of the trial penalty. Of course it is possible that time to disposition may not 
fully capture the organizational cost of a case, however, researchers seeking to test 
theoretical perspectives of sentencing behavior are often forced to rely on the use of 
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proxy measures (see Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn, 2007). Given that the importance of 
processing speed is so heavily emphasized in explanations of the organizational 
efficiency perspective, time to disposition arguably represents a strong operationalization 
of this theoretical construct. 
Under this line of reasoning, it is expected that time to disposition will account for 
some, but not all, of the jury trial penalty, since certain features of jury trials in particular 
may allow for heightened consideration of offender dangerousness and blameworthiness. 
Importantly, jury trials may bring out disparaging facts about the offender, thereby 
increasing perceived blameworthiness (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and Bradley, 
2006). In addition to giving the prosecutor an opportunity to disclose more information 
about the offender and/or the gravity of the crime, emotional witness or victim testimony 
could harm the offender in the eyes of the sentencing judge. Furthermore, offenders 
convicted by jury trial may be seen as less remorseful, and therefore more dangerous, for 
refusing to accept responsibility for their crime (Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006). This is unlikely to be the case for bench trials, as King et al. (2005) argue 
that sentencing differentials associated with bench trials are driven almost exclusively by 
efficiency concerns. Bench trials are less elaborate and entail less information disclosure 
than jury trials (Ulmer, 1997), and in jurisdictions where they consist of recitations of 
stipulated facts, do not involve potentially damaging witness or victim testimony (King et 
al., 2005). It is likewise possible that if bench trials resemble slow or “implicit” pleas, 
judges may be more inclined to view offenders as cooperative and remorseful, similar to 
plea-bargained offenders. Thus, if efficiency is a more salient concern for bench trials, 




Hypothesis 4a: After controlling for time to disposition, the effect of bench trial 
conviction and the effect of jury trial conviction on sentence severity will be 
reduced. 
Hypothesis 4b: The effect of bench trial conviction on sentence severity will be 
reduced by a greater proportion than the effect of jury trial conviction after 
controlling for time to disposition.  
While the effect of mode of conviction is thus expected to be at least partially 
explained by time to disposition, there is also reason to believe, based on the 
organizational efficiency perspective, that mode of conviction may condition the effect of 
time to disposition. As previously mentioned, research (e.g., Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977; 
Flemming, Nardulli, and Eisenstein, 1992; Ulmer, 1997) describes how trials are 
unpleasant to members of the courtroom workgroup, introducing conflict and interrupting 
the normal flow of court activity. On this basis, time spent in processing may represent 
different costs to court actors depending on whether the case is plea-bargained or 
resolved by trial. In particular, court actors may perceive trial time to be more costly than 
non-trial time, which is exactly what Zatz and Lizotte (1985) suggest. In examining the 
influence of various factors on the rate at which cases moved from arrest to disposition, 
Zatz and Lizotte (1985) found a negative effect of case duration for guilty pleas and a 
positive effect of case duration for trials. They interpreted this case duration effect as 
evidence that courts aim to minimize costly trial time, arguing that the results suggest that 
“the system attempts to conserve resources by hastening processing when it is costly and 
slowing processing when it is cheap” (Zatz and Lizotte, 1985: 331). As additional support 
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for this claim, Zatz and Lizotte (1985) point to an earlier study by Flemming, Nardulli, 
and Eisenstein (1987), which found that the longer cases stayed in district court, the faster 
their resolution once they reached the circuit court. The basic premise of Zatz and 
Lizotte’s (1985) argument is that time devoted to trials poses a greater cost to court actors 
than other case processing time, which would imply an interaction between time to 
disposition and mode of conviction, such that increases in case processing time should be 
penalized more severely for trials than for plea-bargained cases. Empirically, this 
hypothesis is supported by Bradley-Engen et al. (2012), who reported a significant, 
positive interaction between case processing time and mode of conviction for terrorist 
offenders convicted in federal court.  
Hypothesis 5: Time to disposition will interact with mode of conviction, with 
increases in time to disposition resulting in greater sentence severity for offenders 





CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4 describes the specific data and method of analysis used to test the 
hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. This chapter begins with a description of 
the Maryland sentencing guidelines and then proceeds to a discussion of the data, 
including the various sources of the data and the sample selection procedure employed. 
Next, an explanation of the dependent, independent, and control variables included in the 
analysis is provided. Finally, the analytic technique chosen for this study is described, 
along with the rationale for its use. 
The Maryland Sentencing Guidelines 
  Sentencing guidelines have been in effect in Maryland since July 1, 1983, when 
the Maryland Judicial Conference voted to implement the guidelines statewide. The main 
goals of Maryland’s sentencing guidelines are to: (1) increase equity in sentencing by 
reducing unwarranted disparity while retaining judicial discretion to individualize 
sentences; (2) articulate an explicit sentencing policy while providing a regular basis for 
policy review and change; (3) provide information for new or rotating judges; and (4) 
promote increased visibility and aid public understanding of the sentencing process 
(Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). The sentencing 
guidelines are purely descriptive, as they were developed based on extensive collection 
and analysis of data on the past sentencing practices of Maryland judges (Maryland State 
Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). Judicial compliance with the 
sentencing guidelines is periodically assessed to determine whether revision is needed to 
make the guidelines more in line with current sentencing trends.   
   The Maryland sentencing guidelines apply to criminal cases prosecuted in circuit 
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court. In Maryland, the district courts have jurisdiction over cases involving 
misdemeanor offenses, whereas the circuit courts have jurisdiction over cases involving 
felony offenses. The district and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction for cases 
involving misdemeanor offenses for which the penalty is confinement for three years or 
more or a fine of $2,500 or more and for cases involving certain felonies, which are 
generally lower-level fraud- and theft-type offenses. In addition, any district court case in 
which the defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial is transferred to circuit court.2 
The following cases are excluded from guidelines coverage: demands for a jury trial from 
district court, unless a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) is ordered; appeals from district 
court, unless a PSI is ordered; crimes that carry no possible penalty of incarceration; and 
violations of public local laws and municipal ordinances (Maryland State Commission on 
Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). The sentencing guidelines recommend whether an 
offender should be sentenced to incarceration as well as provide a sentence length range 
that refers to non-suspended time. The sentencing guidelines recommendation is 
determined by the intersection of an Offense Score and an Offender Score. Maryland 
employs a sentencing guidelines system that utilizes three separate guidelines matrices 
for person, property, and drug offenses. For property and drug offenses, the Offense 
Score is determined by the seriousness category of the offense, which ranges from I (the 
most serious) to VII (the least serious). For person offenses, the Offense Score is 
calculated based on the seriousness category of the offense, the physical or psychological 
injury to the victim, the presence of a weapon, and the vulnerability of the victim. Across 
all three offense types, the Offender Score is determined by the severity of the 
                                                          
2 Jurisdiction of Maryland’s district courts and circuit courts is governed by Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, §4-301 and §4-302, Annotated Code of Maryland. 
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individual’s prior juvenile offending and prior adult criminal record, whether the offender 
was in the criminal justice system at the time of the offense, and whether the offender has 
any prior probation or parole violations (see Appendix A for the Maryland sentencing 
guidelines matrices).  
 Maryland’s sentencing guidelines are voluntary, although Criminal Procedure 
Article, §6-216, Annotated Code of Maryland requires judges to consider the sentencing 
guidelines when deciding on the proper sentence. In addition, judges are mandated to 
provide a reason for sentencing outside the recommended sentence range when they 
choose to depart from the guidelines. Even though few formal incentives exist for judges 
to adhere to the sentencing guidelines, compliance with the guidelines is high, as the 
overall judicial compliance rate has ranged from approximately 73% to 80% over the past 
ten years (Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). 
Data 
 To investigate the effects of time to disposition and mode of conviction on 
sentencing, this study utilizes data collected by the Maryland State Commission on 
Criminal Sentencing Policy (MSCCSP). The MSCCSP is an independent state agency 
created to oversee sentencing policy and monitor Maryland’s sentencing guidelines. In 
fulfillment of its responsibilities, the MSCCSP collects sentencing guidelines worksheets, 
which are used to calculate the guidelines and record sentence information, and 
automates the information contained in the worksheets into the Maryland Sentencing 
Guidelines Database. The Database includes sentencing information for cases dating back 
to 1983, however, only partial data is available prior to 1999, when the MSCCSP 
assumed responsibility for the sentencing guidelines from the Administrative Office of 
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the Courts.  
 The Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database offers several advantages for this 
research. First and foremost, the Database contains detailed information on a variety of 
individual-level characteristics, including offender and offense attributes such as date of 
birth, gender, race and ethnicity, criminal history, specific offense type and severity, 
offense date, and recommended sentence range. Case processing variables are also 
included, which consist of the date of sentencing, mode of conviction, attorney type, 
jurisdiction, and whether a PSI was ordered. In addition, the Database contains the 
sentence outcome for each case, including the amount of incarceration time, suspended 
time, credit for time served, home detention time, and length of the probation term. 
Another important feature of the Database is that since Maryland’s sentencing guidelines 
apply only to cases disposed of in circuit court, more serious cases are represented in the 
Database, which is ideal for studying trial penalties. Finally, data entry and verification 
procedures employed by the MSCCSP staff ensure a high level of confidence in the 
accuracy of the information contained in the Database. The MSCCSP staff reviews the 
sentencing guidelines worksheets for accuracy when they are received, and possible 
errors or omissions are resolved through Maryland Judiciary Case Search or by 
contacting the individual(s) responsible for worksheet completion (Maryland State 
Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). Furthermore, the MSCCSP staff 
spends a significant amount of time each year routinely checking and cleaning the data 
maintained within the Database (Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing 
Policy, 2014). 
 Nevertheless, the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database has certain 
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limitations. Because it is the responsibility of circuit court staff to provide the sentencing 
guidelines worksheets to the MSCCSP, information on guidelines-eligible cases may be 
missing from the Database if circuit court staff fails to complete and/or submit 
worksheets for those cases. While the MSCCSP has determined that overall, sentencing 
guidelines worksheets are received for most eligible cases, worksheet submission rates 
vary substantially across jurisdictions. Most important for the present study, however, is 
that the Database lacks information that would permit an accurate calculation of time to 
disposition for each case. To remedy this, the indictment filing date was researched for 
each case in the sample using the Maryland Judiciary Case Search 
(http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us). The Maryland Judiciary Case Search is maintained 
by the Maryland Judiciary and provides free public access to detailed court records. 
Based on docket numbers and offender names contained in the Maryland Sentencing 
Guidelines Database, indictment filing dates were successfully retrieved and matched to 
approximately 96% of cases in the sample.  
The sample for this study consists of cases sentenced between January 1, 1999 
and June 30, 2012 (the end of Fiscal Year 2012). The data were limited to single-count 
cases,3 since analysis of multiple-count cases introduces additional complexities. In 
particular, in Maryland, one set of sentencing guidelines is calculated for each sentencing 
case, and in multiple-count cases, the guidelines are calculated differently depending on 
whether the counts are determined to be part of one or several criminal “events.” 
Furthermore, the possibility for either concurrent or consecutive sentences affects the 
                                                          
3 Single-count cases are those involving one convicted offense for which the judge must impose a sentence. 
Because merged and nolle prosequi offenses are not considered in the calculation of Maryland’s sentencing 
guidelines and therefore do not contribute to the overall offense count, it is possible that cases designated as 
single count involved more than one offense. 
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overall sentence length calculation in multiple-count cases. This approach has been 
adopted by prior research on sentencing in Maryland (e.g., Bushway and Piehl, 2001; 
Bushway, Owens, and Piehl, 2012; Souryal and Wellford, 1997) and by the MSCCSP in 
its annual reports.4 Reconsiderations for a Crime of Violence (as defined in Criminal Law 
Article, §14-101, Annotated Code of Maryland), three-judge panel reviews, and 
revocations of probation were also excluded from the sample. These restrictions resulted 
in the inclusion of 119,399 cases in the sampling frame. All cases with a bench trial 
(1,367 cases) or jury trial (1,762 cases) conviction were included in the sample to ensure 
that these disposition types were sufficiently represented. For cases resolved by guilty 
plea, a stratified random sampling procedure was employed to select 550 cases within 
each of the person, property, and drug offense types in proportion to the number of 
American Bar Association (ABA) plea agreements,5 non-ABA plea agreements, and 
pleas with no agreement in the population, totaling 1,650 cases convicted by guilty plea. 
After eliminating 204 cases for which the indictment filing date was not available,6 an 
additional 130 observations (approximately 2.7% of the initial sample) were removed due 
to missing information,7 leaving a total of 4,423 cases available for analysis. Statistical 
                                                          
4 Single-count cases account for approximately 75% of the sentencing guidelines worksheets received in a 
given year (Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). A comparison of single-
count and multiple-count cases sentenced between January 1, 1999 and June 30, 2012 showed that drug 
offenses were overrepresented by 13.1% in single-count cases, whereas cases in which a PSI report were 
ordered and jury trials were overrepresented by 14.4% and 7.8%, respectively, in multiple-count cases. In 
addition, offenders in multiple-count cases had significantly greater guidelines sentence recommendations 
and sentence lengths. For both the guidelines sentence recommendation and the length of imprisonment, 
the difference in means between single-count and multiple-count cases was approximately five years. 
5 An ABA plea agreement is one that the court has approved relating to a particular sentence, disposition, 
or other judicial action; under Maryland Rule 4-243(c), the agreement is binding on the court (Maryland 
State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 2014). 
6 In the course of researching indictment filing dates, 22 of the 4,779 cases were removed from the sample, 
as it was discovered that these cases were either violations of probation or appeals, and thus were 
erroneously included in the data. This resulted in a sample of 4,757 cases before exclusions due to missing 
data. 
7 This number includes: 63 cases missing sentence length; 17 cases missing the guidelines sentence 
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power analysis performed using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) indicated that a sample 
size of 395 cases is needed to achieve a power level of 0.80, given a small effect size 
(measured by Cohen’s [1988] f2) and a 0.05 significance threshold for a two-tailed t test 
of a regression coefficient. Thus, the resulting sample should be of more than adequate 
size to test the hypotheses of this study.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
This study focuses on sentence severity as the outcome, represented by the length 
of incarceration ordered in months. The length of incarceration variable refers to the 
amount of jail or prison time to be served from the date of sentencing, and therefore 
excludes credit for time served as well as suspended time.8 Lengths of incarceration range 
from 0 to 720 months,9 with values of 0 months indicating non-confinement sentences 
and values of 720 months indicating life sentences. While research by Holleran and 
Spohn (2004) has argued that qualitative differences between jail and prison sentences 
necessitate disaggregation of the sentencing decision beyond simply incarceration, doing 
so is not feasible in this instance since a clear distinction between sentences to jail and to 
prison is not available for all cases in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database. 
                                                          
recommendation; 32 cases missing the Offender Score; 15 cases missing age; 3 cases missing gender; and 
23 cases missing race/ethnicity. Some cases were missing information on more than one of these variables.  
8 An additional analysis was performed in which the dependent variable was the Guidelines Applicable 
Sentence, which is the portion of the sentence that is considered when determining whether a given 
sentence is compliant with the sentencing guidelines. The Guidelines Applicable Sentence is calculated as 
the sum of jail or prison time to be served from the date of sentencing, home detention time, and credit for 
time served. The results remained the same in magnitude, directionality, and significance as those from the 
analysis that used length of incarceration as the dependent variable.  
9 Two cases in the sample had lengths of incarceration of 840 and 960 months, however, both were recoded 
to 720 months. Maryland Judiciary Case Search indicated that for the first case, a sentence of life was 
ordered, although the sentence was recorded as 70 years. Similarly, the sentence for the second case was a 
life term with all but 80 years suspended. Since the MSCCSP assigns life sentences a numerical equivalent 





 The two main variables of interest for this study are time to disposition and mode 
of conviction. Time to disposition indicates the amount of time from the indictment filing 
date to the date of sentencing in months. The date the indictment was filed for a case 
provides a reasonable starting point for when that case entered the Maryland circuit court 
system and has been used by prior research (e.g., Bradley-Engen et al., 2012) in 
measuring case processing time. Although the sentencing date can oftentimes be the same 
as the date of conviction, the present study uses the former to mark the termination of a 
case. This is done both out of necessity (the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database 
does not include date of conviction) and because additional court time and resources can 
be expended from conviction to sentencing. For cases in the sample, time to disposition 
ranges from 0.1 months (3 days) to 137.5 months (approximately 11 years). The high 
skew to this variable was addressed by top-coding cases at 44.2 months. This value 
served as a natural cut point in the distribution of time to disposition, as several cases had 
disposition times either equaling or close to 44.2 months, whereas there was a visible gap 
in disposition times after this point.10  
Mode of conviction is recorded in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database 
                                                          
10 This approach affected 12 cases. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine whether the results 
were altered when the original disposition times for these cases were used. Overall, the results for Model 2 
were similar in magnitude, directionality, and significance. The most substantial change occurred in the 
mode of conviction-specific models, as the effect of time to disposition on sentence severity for guilty pleas 
reduced to non-significance. For 9 of the 12 cases, Maryland Judiciary Case Search indicated that the case 
involved a failure to appear by the offender that spanned multiple years. As a result, these cases arguably 
represent anomalies with regard to time to disposition, in which case top-coding is reasonable. Removing 
these cases from the analysis did not substantively alter the results from when they were top-coded. An 
alternative method of top-coding suggested by Nagin and Smith (1990) was also considered in a 
supplemental analysis, whereby extreme outliers were recoded to the 99th percentile (32.6 months). The 
results from this analysis were similar to those when 44.2 months was used as the top-coding value.   
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as one of the following: ABA plea agreement, non-ABA plea agreement, plea with no 
agreement, bench trial, or jury trial. Given that the interest of this study is in sentencing 
differentials specifically associated with bench trials and jury trials, the three types of 
plea dispositions are collapsed into a single category. In general, ABA plea agreements 
are the most common type of plea, accounting for approximately 50% of all guilty pleas, 
followed by non-ABA plea agreements and finally pleas with no agreement. Thus, mode 
of conviction is captured using two dummy variables, one for bench trials and one for 
jury trials, with guilty pleas serving as the reference.  
Control Variables 
 Based on prior research, several legal and extralegal variables are included as 
controls. The legal variables consist of the guidelines sentence recommendation, the prior 
criminality of the offender, the offense type, the level of the offense, and whether the 
offense carries a mandatory minimum penalty. The guidelines sentence recommendation 
is included to control for the influence of offense seriousness and criminal history on the 
sentence outcome in a way that accounts for nonlinear effects of these variables under the 
sentencing guidelines (see Engen and Gainey, 2000a). As Kurlychek and Johnson (2010) 
noted, use of the guidelines sentence recommendation is additionally advantageous in this 
research context since under the Maryland sentencing guidelines, different metrics of 
offense seriousness are used for person, property, and drug offenses. While the guidelines 
sentence recommendation has been captured differently depending on the specific 
sentencing guidelines system, this study follows prior research on sentencing in Maryland 
(e.g., Bushway and Piehl, 2001; Kurlychek and Johnson, 2010) and uses the midpoint of 
the guidelines range. The prior criminality of the offender, captured by the Offender 
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Score calculated under the sentencing guidelines, is additionally included, as Ulmer 
(2000) argued that including measures of criminal history and offense seriousness is 
important even when one has already controlled for the guidelines sentence 
recommendation. In this regard, the Offender Score variable represents the influence of 
criminal history on the sentencing decision above and beyond its role in determining the 
guidelines sentence recommendation (Engen and Gainey, 2000b). Because the guidelines 
sentence recommendation is highly correlated with offense seriousness (r = 0.73 for 
person offenses, rs = 0.68 for drug offenses, and rs = 0.46 for property offenses), the latter 
is not included.   
 Three additional factors are included to control for legally relevant considerations. 
The offense type is measured with two dummy variables representing property and drug 
offenses, with offenses against a person serving as the reference category. The level of 
the offense is also captured with a dummy variable, coded 1 for felony offenses and 0 for 
misdemeanor offenses. Since cases involving offenses that carry legislatively-required 
mandatory minimum penalties may be “dead-bang” cases that progress more quickly 
through the courts (Zatz and Lizotte, 1985), and because such mandatory minimums have 
a substantial influence on the final sentence, a dummy variable indicating whether a non-
suspendable mandatory minimum penalty is attached to the offense is included as well.  
 In addition to the above legal variables, several extralegal variables are employed 
as controls.  Offender characteristics include the age, gender, and race/ethnicity of the 
offender, which have been found to be important determinants of the sentencing decision 
(e.g., Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998).  Offender age is calculated as of the date 
of sentencing using the offender’s birth date. A dummy variable, coded 1 for males and 0 
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for females, is used to measure the gender of the offender. The race/ethnicity of the 
offender is distinguished with dummy variables for Blacks, Hispanics, and offenders of 
other races (including Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders, American Indian/Alaskan 
Natives, Asians, and other or unidentifiable groups), with Whites serving as the reference 
category. Several case-processing variables are also included. A dummy variable for 
whether a PSI report was ordered is used to control for possible exposure to negative 
information about the offender that occurs apart from the mode of conviction. Since 
11.6% of cases were missing information on whether a PSI was ordered, a dummy-coded 
missing data indicator for this variable is included, which allows cases with missing 
values to be retained in the analysis without biasing the other coefficients. Because there 
is considerable debate regarding the effectiveness of different attorney types (Cohen, 
2014; Hartley, Miller, and Spohn, 2010), the type of representation is also included, 
which compares private attorneys with public defenders and other representation 
(including court-appointed attorneys, self-representation, and unknown representation).11 
Finally, given that prior research has demonstrated significant contextual variation in 
sentencing (e.g., Johnson, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), the jurisdiction where the 
case was heard is captured with a series of dummy variables distinguishing among the 
eight judicial circuits in Maryland (the Eighth Circuit is used as the reference category).12  
                                                          
11 There were very few cases in which the type of representation was court-appointed or self (25 and 83 
cases, respectively). An additional analysis was conducted that included separate dummy variables for 
public defenders, court-appointed attorneys, self-representation, and missing representation type. The 
results remained the same regardless of which of the two ways was used to measure the type of 
representation. 
12 Each of the 23 counties in Maryland and the city of Baltimore has its own circuit court, which is grouped 
into one of eight geographical circuits. The counties in each judicial circuit are provided in Appendix B. It 
was not possible to include county-level dummy variables due to the small number of cases in certain 
counties. To control for correlation among cases sentenced within the same jurisdiction, the analysis was 




 The present study has two purposes: to examine the effect of time to disposition 
on sentence outcomes, and to assess the role of time in the trial penalty by examining the 
impact that controlling for time to disposition has on mode of conviction effects. To this 
end, a three-step analysis is performed. First, a typical model of sentencing that includes 
mode of conviction as well as controls for legal and extralegal factors is estimated. The 
next step involves estimation of a second model that builds on the first by incorporating a 
measure of time to disposition. Finally, models using time to disposition to predict 
sentence severity are estimated separately for each mode of conviction category, along 
with a combined bench/jury trial category. In this way, the second and third steps provide 
estimates of the effect of time to disposition on sentence severity, while comparison of 
the models from the first and second steps reveal the change in the effect of mode of 
conviction that results from the inclusion of time to disposition. 
For each of these models, Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958) is utilized as the method 
of analysis. Tobit regression is suitable for this study given the limited nature of the 
dependent variable. Specifically, sentence length fits the definition of a corner solution 
outcome, as it is continuously distributed over a range of strictly positive values, but 
takes on the value zero with positive probability (Wooldridge, 2010). The dependent 
variable is additionally bounded at the value 720, since sentence lengths are capped at 60 
years. Wooldridge (2010) argues that in such instances, Tobit regression is preferable to 
ordinary least-squares regression, since use of the latter results in biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates, allows for negative predicted values, and incorrectly imposes 
constant partial effects and a linear relationship between the parameters and the 
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conditional expectation of the observed outcome.  
 The Tobit regression model is a type of censored regression model13 that 
conceptualizes the dependent variable as a latent, unobserved variable, yi*, to which the 
explanatory variables, xi, are linearly related: 
yi* = xiβ + εi 
The outcome that is actually observed, yi, depends upon the value of the latent variable 
such that the observed outcome will be the same as the latent variable when the value of 
the latent variable is between the threshold values, in this case zero and 720, otherwise 
the threshold values will be observed. In mathematical terms: 
yi = 0 if yi* ≤ 0; 
yi = yi* if 0 < yi* < 720; 
yi = 720 if yi* ≥ 720. 
Although Wooldridge (2010) cautions against placing too much emphasis on the 
latent variable in the case of corner solution outcomes, in this particular instance, the 
latent variable can be thought of as sentence severity, whereas the observed variable 
refers to the length of incarceration ordered (Kurlychek and Johnson, 2010). Using 
maximum likelihood, the Tobit regression model estimates a vector of coefficients, ?̂? , 
representing the effects of the predictors on the conditional expectation of the latent 
variable, E[yi* | xi]. This prediction of the latent variable captures both the probability of 
falling within the threshold values and the expectation of the outcome conditional on 
falling within the threshold values. Thus in this research context, the use of Tobit 
                                                          
13 Wooldridge (2010) notes that for corner solution outcomes, the term “corner solution model” is more 
appropriate, however, this class of models is commonly referred to as censored regression models.  
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regression accounts for the likelihood of incarceration as well as the length of 
confinement for those offenders receiving a sentence of incarceration (Kurlychek and 
Johnson, 2004).  In addition to reporting the Tobit coefficients, the present study reports 
fully-standardized coefficients, represented as SD(β), to permit a comparison of the 
magnitudes of the effects of the variables. The fully-standardized coefficients are 
interpreted as the standard deviation change in the latent variable that is associated with a 
one standard deviation increase in the predictor, and are calculated as 
𝜎𝑘𝛽𝑘
𝜎𝑦∗
, where 𝜎𝑘 is 
the standard deviation of the predictor 𝑘, 𝛽𝑘 is the Tobit coefficient for the predictor 𝑘, 
and 𝜎𝑦∗ is the unconditional standard deviation of the latent variable (Long, 1997). While 
fully-standardized coefficients facilitate assessment of effect sizes, they do not easily lend 
themselves to substantive interpretation, as the meaning of a standard deviation increase 
in the predictor is often unclear, especially for dummy variables (Long, 1997). For this 
reason, in the subsequent chapter, findings are discussed in terms of y-standardized 
coefficients, which provide the standard deviation change in the latent variable associated 
with a one unit change in the predictor.14 In this regard, retaining the standardization of 
the dependent variable, sentence severity, is useful given the arbitrary nature of its scale 
(Long, 1997). 
As is true of all statistical models, the Tobit regression model has some 
restrictions. Most importantly, it assumes that the predictors that affect whether an 
observation falls within the threshold values are the same predictors that affect the 
                                                          
14 Y-standardized coefficients are calculated as 
𝛽𝑘
𝜎𝑦∗
, where 𝛽𝑘 is the Tobit coefficient for the predictor 𝑘 and 
𝜎𝑦∗ is the unconditional standard deviation of the latent variable (Long, 1997). Both fully-standardized and 
y-standardized coefficients were calculated in STATA using Long and Freese’s (2014) listcoef 
postestimation command with the std option, which is compatible with the Tobit regression model. 
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expectation of the observed outcome conditional on falling within the threshold values. 
Substantively, this means that the same factors are responsible for the decision to 
incarcerate and the length of incarceration ordered, therefore implying that judicial 
decision making follows a one-step process (Bushway and Piehl, 2001).  While much 
research (e.g., Kramer and Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer and Bradley, 2006; Ulmer and Johnson, 
2004; Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010) argues for modeling sentencing as a two-
step process, Bushway and Piehl (2001) and Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum (2007) note 
that this assumption is largely based on research by Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode (1982: 
642) on white-collar offenders sentenced in the federal district courts, in which judges 
indicated that “the first and hardest decision the judge makes is whether the person will 
go to prison or not.” Yet, as Bushway and Piehl (2001) explain, Wheeler, Weisburd, and 
Bode’s (1982) study was conducted during the era of indeterminate sentencing, when the 
length of an offender’s prison sentence was primarily determined by the parole board. 
Following sentencing reform, which introduced sentencing guidelines and significantly 
limited the discretion of parole boards, the assumption of a two-step judicial decision-
making process became less valid (Bushway and Piehl, 2001; Bushway, Johnson, and 
Slocum, 2007). Furthermore, when sentencing is conceptualized as a two-step process, 
the appropriate analytical technique is to use a selection model, which requires 
specification of exclusion restrictions (factors that influence the in/out decision but not 
the incarceration length decision) in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity and inflated 
standard errors (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum, 2007). Identification of proper 
exclusion restrictions is difficult, however, as Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum (2007) 
explain that rarely have criminologists been able to come up with theoretically-defensible 
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exclusion restrictions. Thus, given that judicial decision making in Maryland takes place 
under sentencing guidelines, it seems justified to model sentencing as a one-step process 
in this study. 
 A second restriction of the Tobit regression model is that it assumes that error 
terms associated with the latent variable are normally distributed and homoscedastic 
(Wooldridge, 2010). These assumptions are important, since violating them may result in 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2010). While it is not possible 
to directly test these assumptions (Bushway and Piehl, 2001), possible violations can be 
detected by comparing coefficient estimates from the Tobit regression model with those 
provided by semiparametric censored regression models (Chay and Powell, 2001). 
Accordingly, the present study compares coefficient estimates from the Tobit regression, 
Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares (Powell, 1986), and Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations15 (Powell, 1984) models. Both the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares 
estimator and the Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator impose weaker 
distributional assumptions than the Tobit regression model. In particular, the 
Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator requires the assumption that the error 
terms associated with the latent variable are symmetrically distributed around zero (Chay 
and Honoré, 1998). The estimator is motivated by a trimming of the data to restore the 
symmetry in the distribution of the actual error terms that is ruined by censoring, which 
then allows the regression coefficients to be estimated by least squares (Chay and Powell, 
2001). The coefficient estimates from the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares 
estimator are interpreted in the same way as those from the Tobit regression model, as 
                                                          
15 The data for this study meet the requirements for the Censored Least Absolute Deviations model in that 
fewer than 50% of the observations fall outside of the threshold values.  
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they provide the effects of the predictors on the conditional expectation of the latent 
variable. Compared to the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator, the 
Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator makes a less restrictive distributional 
assumption, specifically, that the conditional median of the error terms associated with 
the latent variable is zero (Chay and Powell, 2001). It too trims the data so as to make the 
median of the observed variable unaffected by censoring, thus enabling the coefficients to 
be estimated by least absolute deviations (Chay and Powell, 2001). Because the 
coefficients from the Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator are estimated by 
median regression, they represent the effects of the predictors on the conditional median 
of the latent variable (Britt, 2009). Yet, the assumption of a zero conditional median of 
the error terms necessitates that the coefficient estimates from the Censored Least 
Absolute Deviations estimator are directly comparable to those from the Tobit regression 
model and the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator. Since the Symmetrically 
Trimmed Least Squares and Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimators delete 
observations in estimation, they are less efficient than the Tobit regression model. 
Nevertheless, the estimators are useful for producing consistent parameter estimates and 
assessing potential bias in the Tobit regression model.   
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. 
With regard to the outcome of interest, the mean sentence length for offenders in the 
sample is 56.7 months. Of the 4,423 cases in the sample, 1,226 have sentence lengths of 
zero months, representing non-confinement sentences, and 68 have sentence lengths of 
720 months, representing sentences of life imprisonment. Consistent with the notion of 
trial penalties, the mean sentence length for offenders convicted by jury trial is 
substantially longer than that for plea-bargained offenders, with the mean sentence length 
for offenders convicted by bench trial falling in between. On average, offenders who pled 
guilty received sentences of 19.9 months, compared to 42.6 months for bench trial-
convicted offenders and 101.8 months for jury trial-convicted offenders.16  
 The mean length of time between indictment filing and sentencing is 8.1 months. 
As would be expected, offenders who pled guilty have the shortest mean length of time to 
disposition, followed by offenders convicted by bench trial and finally offenders 
convicted by jury trial. The average time to disposition for guilty pleas, bench trials, and 
jury trials is 6.5, 8.2, and 9.6 months, respectively. Figure 1 shows the distributions of 
time to disposition by mode of conviction. These distributions suggest that for each 
disposition type, there is considerable variability in the amount of time, and therefore 
possibly the organizational cost, involved in disposing of cases. 
 The study sample is predominantly male (89.5%) and African-American (66.0%), 
with an average age of 31.4 years. The mean Offender Score (on a scale of 0 to 9) is 3.1, 
                                                          
16 For offenders receiving a sentence of incarceration, the mean sentence length is 78.5 months for all 




and the mean guidelines sentence recommendation, represented by the midpoint of the 
guidelines range, is 68.7 months. Reflecting the greater overall seriousness of circuit 
court cases, 64.4% of offenders in the sample were convicted of a felony offense, 
although only 2.4% of offenders were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty. A PSI report was ordered for a little less than half (41.6%) of the 
sample. Slightly more offenders were represented by a public defender than by private 
counsel (42.7% versus 35.5%); 21.8% had another or unknown type of representation. By 
far the greatest percentage of the sample, 24.3%, was convicted in the Eighth Circuit, 




Table 1.  Description of Sample (N = 4,423) 
Variables Frequency % Mean SD 
Sentence length (capped at 720 months)     
All cases   56.74 112.87 
Guilty pleas   19.91 46.99 
Bench trials   42.56 85.39 
Jury trials   101.79 152.50 
Independent variables     
Time to disposition (capped at 44.2 months)     
All cases   8.11 5.93 
Guilty pleas   6.48 5.62 
Bench trials   8.22 5.35 
Jury trials   9.56 6.23 
Mode of conviction     
Guilty plea 1,525 34.48   
Bench trial 1,256 28.40   
Jury trial 1,642 37.12   
Control variables     
Guidelines sentence recommendation (months)   68.73 105.51 
Offender Score   3.08 2.56 
Offense type     
Person  2,088 47.21   
Drug 1,387 31.36   
Property 948 21.43   
Level of offense     
Misdemeanor 1,577 35.65   
Felony 2,846 64.35   
Mandatory minimum penalty     
No 4,315 97.56   
Yes 108 2.44   
Age   31.38 10.64 
Gender     
Female 463 10.47   
Male 3,960 89.53   
Race/ethnicity     
White 1,308 29.57   
Black 2,920 66.02   
Hispanic 153 3.46   
Other 42 0.95   
PSI report ordered     
No 2,074 46.89   
Yes 1,840 41.60   
Missing 509 11.51   
Type of representation     
Private attorney 1,572 35.54   
Public defender 1,888 42.69   
Other representation 963 21.77   
Jurisdiction     
First Circuit 464 10.49   
Second Circuit 302 6.83   
Third Circuit 741 16.75   
Fourth Circuit 223 5.04   
Fifth Circuit 487 11.01   
Sixth Circuit 317 7.17   
Seventh Circuit 813 18.38   
Eighth Circuit 1,076 24.33   
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Bivariate correlations among the independent and dependent variables in the 
study are presented in Table 2 (in the interest of space, correlations between the 
independent and control variables are omitted). As preliminary support for the hypotheses 
in this study, time to disposition has a positive, significant relationship with sentence 
length (r = 0.21). Furthermore, jury trial conviction is positively and significantly related 
to both time to disposition (r = 0.19) and sentence length (r = 0.31). Contrary to 
expectations, the correlation between bench trial conviction and sentence length, while 
significant, is negative (r = -0.08).  It is also worth noting that in line with prediction, 
bench trial conviction is positively associated with time to disposition (r = 0.01), though 
this relationship failed to reach statistical significance.  
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 Sentence length Time to disposition Bench trial Jury trial 
Sentence length --    
Time to disposition 0.2127*** --   
Bench trial -0.0791*** 0.0109 --  
Jury trial 0.3067*** 0.1870*** -0.4839*** -- 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
  The highest correlations between the independent and control variables in the 
study are those between the mode of conviction variables (r = -0.48), the representation 
type variables (r = -0.46), the guidelines sentence recommendation and the Offender 
Score variables (r = 0.36), and the offense type variables (r = -0.35). This is to be 
expected, since the mode of conviction, representation type, and offense type variables 
are dummy coded and thus inherently related to each other (Cohen and Cohen, 1983). 
The moderate correlation between the guidelines sentence recommendation and the 
Offender Score variables is also not surprising, given that the Offender Score, together 
with the Offense Score, determines the guidelines range. Overall, the sizes of these 
correlations do not raise concern regarding multicollinearity.  
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 To test the study hypotheses regarding the effects of time to disposition and mode 
of conviction, the analysis proceeded in three steps. In the first step, a baseline model 
(Model 1) predicting sentence severity was estimated, which included mode of conviction 
in addition to legal and extralegal control variables. Next, time to disposition was 
incorporated in a second model (Model 2) of sentence severity. The results of Models 1 
and 2 are presented in Table 3. Model 1 shows that, compared to offenders who plead 
guilty, offenders convicted by bench trial and offenders convicted by jury trial receive 
sentences that are significantly more severe. Furthermore, the effect of jury trial 
conviction on sentence severity is greater than that of bench trial conviction.17 Being 
convicted by bench trial increases sentence severity by 0.1491 standard deviations, 
whereas being convicted by jury trial increases sentence severity by 0.4077 standard 
deviations. Together, these results provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. In fact, 
conviction by jury trial has the second largest effect of all of the variables in Model 1, 
behind only the guidelines sentence recommendation. The effect of bench trial conviction 
is also substantial, as it exerts a greater effect on sentence severity than any of the other 
extralegal variables, with the exception of the First Circuit variable.   
Except for the Offender Score, all of the legal control variables in Model 1 are 
significant in predicting sentence severity. Not surprisingly, offenders with higher 
guidelines sentence recommendations and those convicted of felony offenses receive 
generally more severe sentences relative to other offenders, whereas offenders convicted 
of drug offenses, property offenses, and offenses that carry a mandatory minimum 
                                                          
17 A Wald test of equality of the coefficients for bench trial conviction and jury trial conviction in Model 1 
reported an F-statistic of 35.51 and an associated p-value of close to 0.000, which suggests that the effects 
of these two variables on sentence severity are significantly different from one another. 
68 
 
penalty receive less severe sentences. The non-significance of the Offender Score 
variable may suggest that at least for this sample of offenders, the effect of criminal 
history operates primarily through the sentencing guidelines. With regard to the 
extralegal control variables in the model, gender, race/ethnicity, and type of 
representation exert significant effects on sentence severity, such that males, Blacks, 
Hispanics, and offenders represented by a public defender (compared to offenders 
represented by private counsel) are more likely to receive harsher sentences. Offenders 
for whom a PSI report was ordered are also sentenced more severely. It should be noted 
that the dummy variable indicating missing information for whether a PSI report was 
ordered is not significant, which suggests that missing data on this variable may be 
random in relationship to sentence severity. Unexpectedly, the effect of offender age on 
sentence severity is not significant; however, this finding is consistent with prior research 
that examines sentencing in Maryland using Tobit regression (i.e., Bushway and Piehl, 
2001).18 Finally, the results from Model 1 show that the judicial circuit in which the case 
is heard significantly influences the sentence an offender receives. Compared to the 
Eighth Circuit, all of the other judicial circuits mete out substantially more severe 
sentences, with the First Circuit being especially punitive (although the effect of the 
Seventh Circuit on sentence severity is only marginally significant). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the organizational efficiency perspective of 
court actor behavior, the results for Model 2 reveal a significant, direct effect of time to 
disposition on sentence severity.19 For a 1-month increase in time to disposition, sentence 
                                                          
18 Based on earlier work by Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Ulmer (1995), the analysis was also performed 
with an additional quadratic term for age; however, the quadratic term was not significant. 
19 To test for a possible nonlinear effect of time to disposition on sentence severity, Model 2 was re-
estimated with an additional quadratic term for time to disposition. The results from this analysis showed 
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severity is expected to increase by 0.005 standard deviations. Although time to 
disposition does not have one of the largest effect sizes among the variables in Model 2, 
its effect on sentence severity is nevertheless similar in magnitude to extralegal factors 
such as race/ethnicity and representation type that are a prominent focus of sentencing 
research. Comparing Model 1 with Model 2, however, shows that Hypotheses 4a and 4b 
are not supported. Contrary to the organizational efficiency explanation of trial penalties, 
controlling for time to disposition barely decreases the effects of bench trial conviction 
and jury trial conviction on sentence severity, which remain large and significant in 
Model 2. Specifically, Model 2 reports that being convicted by bench trial increases 
sentence severity by 0.1444 standard deviations, and being convicted by jury trial 
increases sentence severity by 0.3957 standard deviations. This translates into a 3.14% 
reduction in the size of the coefficient for bench trial conviction and a 2.95% reduction in 
the size of the coefficient for jury trial conviction from Model 1 to Model 2. There is 
likewise considerable overlap in the 95% confidence intervals associated with the mode 
of conviction coefficients between Models 1 and 2, indicating that the changes in these 
coefficients are not statistically significant at p = 0.05.20 In addition, although technically 
the effect of bench trial conviction is reduced by a greater percentage than that of jury 
trial conviction, the difference between the two percentages is only 0.19. Thus, in Model 
2, substantial bench and jury trial penalties remain that are not accounted for by time to 
disposition. The effects of the legal and extralegal control variables also remain relatively 
consistent across the two models.
                                                          
that the quadratic term was not significant.  
20 The 95% confidence interval for the bench trial conviction coefficient is [3.22, 35.71] in Model 1 and 
[3.11, 34.59] in Model 2. The 95% confidence interval for the jury trial conviction coefficient is [27.35, 
79.09] in Model 1 and [26.56, 76.75] in Model 2. 
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Table 3.  Tobit Regression Models of Sentence Severity, All Modes of Conviction 
  Model 1  Model 2  
  β S.E. SD(β)  β S.E. SD(β)  
Constant  -90.76 10.97 --***  -95.10 10.80 --***  
Independent Variables          
Time to disposition  -- -- --  0.65 0.22 0.03**  
Bench trial  19.46 8.29 0.07*  18.85 8.03 0.07*  
Jury trial  53.22 13.19 0.20***  51.65 12.80 0.19***  
Control Variables          




0.94 0.05 0.76*** 
 
0.93 0.05 0.75*** 
 
Offender Score  -0.77 0.71 -0.02  -0.80 0.70 -0.02  
Drug offense  -20.60 5.04 -0.07***  -20.61 4.92 -0.07***  
Property offense  -8.76 2.64 -0.03**  -8.55 2.68 -0.03**  
Felony offense  17.56 3.34 0.06***  17.13 3.51 0.06***  
Mandatory minimum penalty  -18.45 8.89 -0.02*  -18.48 8.95 -0.02*  
Extralegal          
Age  -0.15 0.17 -0.01  -0.16 0.18 -0.01  
Male  18.08 2.93 0.04***  18.06 2.85 0.04***  
Black  9.53 2.72 0.03***  9.26 2.79 0.03**  
Hispanic  16.22 7.43 0.02*  15.61 7.53 0.02*  
Other race  12.27 11.44 0.01  11.53 11.21 0.01  
PSI report ordered  10.51 4.55 0.04*  9.66 4.50 0.04*  
Missing PSI report  2.11 1.92 0.01  1.98 2.01 0.004  
Public defender  4.99 2.29 0.02*  5.94 2.27 0.02**  
Other representation  8.27 4.37 0.03†  8.99 4.55 0.03*  
First Circuit  38.91 4.30 0.09***  41.10 4.27 0.10***  
Second Circuit  16.40 6.03 0.03**  17.45 5.93 0.03**  
Third Circuit  15.35 4.07 0.04***  15.65 3.95 0.04***  
Fourth Circuit  22.87 4.11 0.04***  25.20 4.12 0.04***  
Fifth Circuit  12.89 3.26 0.03***  13.89 3.24 0.03***  
Sixth Circuit  12.52 5.01 0.02*  14.09 4.99 0.03**  
Seventh Circuit  10.23 6.28 0.03  11.01 6.18 0.03†  
          
Sigma  68.03 2.63   67.94 2.65   
N   4,423    4,423   
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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As previously mentioned, Tobit regression is sensitive to violations of the 
assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity of the error terms associated with the 
latent variable, in that such violations can result in inconsistent parameter estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  To check for possible misspecification, Models 1 and 2 were re-
estimated using the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares and Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations estimators, the results for which are reported in Table 4. The coefficient 
estimates for time to disposition from the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares and 
Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimators closely match that given by the Tobit 
regression model, as the Tobit regression model reports ?̂? = 0. 65, the Symmetrically 
Trimmed Least Squares estimator reports ?̂? = 0. 64, and the Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations estimator reports ?̂? = 0. 61. This suggests that the choice of the Tobit 
regression model is not biasing the effect of time to disposition. Although the results 
from the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator indicate that the effect of time 
to disposition on sentence severity is not significant, this is likely due to the relative 
inefficiency of the estimator, which deletes additional observations in estimation. This 
inefficiency is apparent in the larger standard error for time to disposition reported by the 
Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator (S.E. = 0.41) compared to that reported 
by the Tobit regression model (S.E. = 0. 22). 
A comparison of the coefficient estimates for bench trial conviction and jury trial 
conviction from the Tobit regression model, Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares 
estimator, and Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator reveal non-negligible 
differences among the three estimators for these variables. That is, for bench trial 
conviction, the Tobit regression model reports ?̂? = 18.85, the Symmetrically Trimmed 
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Least Squares estimator reports ?̂? = 69.53, and the Censored Least Absolute Deviations 
estimator reports ?̂? = 39.57 in Model 2. Similarly, for jury trial conviction, the Tobit 
regression model reports ?̂? = 51.65, the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares estimator 
reports ?̂? = 117.69, and the Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator reports ?̂? = 
68.11 in Model 2. Despite these varying estimates, however, the substantive conclusions 
remain the same across estimators. Like those from the Tobit regression model, the 
results from the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares and Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations estimators show large, significant effects of bench trial conviction and jury 
trial conviction on sentence severity, with a greater effect for jury trial conviction than for 
bench trial conviction. Furthermore, the results from the Symmetrically Trimmed Least 
Squares and Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimators similarly indicate very little 
change in the magnitude of the effects of bench trial conviction and jury trial conviction 
from including time to disposition in Model 2. Specifically, the Symmetrically Trimmed 
Least Squares estimator reports a 2.86% decrease in the effect of bench trial conviction 
and a 3.00% decrease in the effect of jury trial conviction from Model 1 to Model 2, and 
the Censored Least Absolute Deviations estimator reports a 1.30% decrease in the effect 
of bench trial conviction and a 3.47% decrease in the effect of jury trial conviction from 
Model 1 to Model 2. Consequently, regardless of the estimator used, it appears that time 
to disposition is not primarily responsible for the effects of bench trial conviction and 
jury trial conviction on sentence severity. 
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Table 4.  Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares and Censored Least Absolute Deviations Models of Sentence Severity, All Modes of Conviction 
 Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares  Censored Least Absolute Deviations 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
 β S.E.  β S.E.  β S.E.  β S.E. 
Constant -193.69*** 29.44  -195.42*** 29.04  -103.05* 15.20  -106.73* 14.21 
Independent Variables            
Time to disposition -- --  0.64 0.41  -- --  0.61* 0.26 
Bench trial 71.52*** 15.17  69.53*** 15.61  40.09* 13.81  39.57* 12.74 
Jury trial 121.33*** 14.59  117.69*** 15.26  70.56* 13.23  68.11* 12.83 
Control Variables            










Offender Score -2.68* 1.06  -2.69* 1.04  -0.05 0.53  -0.27 0.71 
Drug offense -32.90*** 4.64  -32.60*** 4.60  -17.11* 4.09  -16.23* 5.12 
Property offense -28.68*** 5.87  -27.29*** 5.78  -9.78* 3.92  -8.80* 4.37 










Extralegal            
Age 0.28 0.22  0.24 0.21  -0.13 0.11  -0.10 0.12 
Male 35.70† 18.31  34.12† 18.03  20.29* 9.42  24.19* 8.89 
Black 22.94** 6.86  23.16** 6.91  8.32* 4.01  6.98 3.59 
Hispanic 25.80* 11.96  25.68* 11.77  16.89 10.34  14.06 8.17 
Other race 29.01* 14.59  28.78* 13.45  23.49 17.03  24.29 15.97 
PSI report ordered 1.07 5.43  0.42 5.49  2.05 3.67  1.10 3.80 
Missing PSI report -8.17 8.54  -8.00 8.49  0.24 4.64  1.45 5.10 
Public defender 4.82 4.80  5.97 4.87  3.52 2.68  1.94 3.25 
Other representation 9.63 6.48  10.00 6.43  4.88 3.86  2.90 3.96 
First Circuit 22.47** 7.22  26.48*** 7.30  22.25* 6.14  23.09* 6.68 
Second Circuit -17.69 13.43  -14.14 13.24  12.19 6.52  11.90 7.23 
Third Circuit 16.58* 7.20  17.65* 7.11  8.32 4.78  8.66 4.90 
Fourth Circuit -2.72 10.62  1.26 11.08  21.43* 7.63  23.16 7.15 
Fifth Circuit 5.13 8.76  5.47 8.76  4.47 6.87  2.17 6.97 
Sixth Circuit -4.93 9.34  -2.41 9.69  -3.66 7.58  -1.67 6.13 
Seventh Circuit 0.93 7.36  3.20 7.46  4.06 6.21  5.16 6.04 
            
N 1,861  1,874  2,359  2,411 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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In order to determine whether the effect of time to disposition is conditioned by 
the mode of conviction, as a third step in the analysis, models predicting sentence 
severity were estimated individually for guilty pleas, bench trials, jury trials, and all trials 
combined. Table 5 presents the results from the four Tobit regression models. Statistical 
tests for significant differences in coefficients across models (Paternoster et al., 1998) 
were also performed, and are reported in Table 6.21 As Table 5 demonstrates, time to 
disposition is a significant predictor of sentence severity for cases that are resolved by 
guilty plea. For these cases, a 1-month increase in time to disposition increases sentence 
severity by 0.0055 standard deviations. This effect is greater than that of being convicted 
of an offense that carries a mandatory minimum penalty, being Hispanic, or being 
represented by a public defender. Interestingly, while time to disposition is not a 
significant predictor of sentence severity in the individual bench and jury trial models, it 
reaches statistical significance in the model that considers bench and jury trials together. 
This discrepancy may be due to differences in statistical power between the models or the 
larger variation in time to disposition for both bench and jury trial cases. For trials, the 
coefficient for time to disposition is slightly larger than that for guilty pleas, with a 1-
month increase in time to disposition increasing sentence severity by 0.0062 standard 
deviations. Table 6 indicates that the difference in the effect of time to disposition 
between guilty pleas and trials is statistically significant at p = 0.10. By contrast, a 
statistical comparison of the coefficient estimates for time to disposition across the guilty 
plea, bench trial, and jury trial models failed to demonstrate that the effect of time to 
                                                          
21 Paternoster et al. (1998) state that their formula for testing for differences between regression coefficients 
across independent samples is applicable to the Tobit regression model. 
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disposition is significantly different across the three modes of conviction.22 These results 
therefore appear to provide support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted a greater effect of 
time to disposition on sentence severity for trials than for guilty pleas.  
Several other noteworthy findings emerge from the mode of conviction-specific 
models. The results indicate that the effect of the guidelines sentence recommendation on 
sentence severity is significantly greater for cases convicted through bench or jury trials 
than for cases convicted through guilty pleas, which follows if sentences for guilty pleas 
are more likely to deviate from the sentencing guidelines. In addition, significance tests 
demonstrate that the effects of conviction for a property offense and conviction for a 
felony offense are significantly greater for jury trials compared to other cases, although 
these differences become non-significant when bench and jury trials are combined into a 
single category. Also important is that the overall effect of being convicted of an offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, which Table 3 shows is negative, appears to be 
driven largely by jury trials. Indeed, Table 6 reports that this effect is significantly 
different for jury trials than for guilty pleas and bench trials. For jury trials, being 
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty strongly decreases 
sentence severity, whereas for guilty pleas and bench trials it increases sentence severity. 
Like time to disposition, age is a significant predictor of sentence severity only for cases 
convicted by guilty plea. This effect is significantly greater than that for jury trials, and is 
marginally significantly greater than that for bench trials. The effect of gender also varies 
                                                          
22 As an alternative to estimating separate models for each mode of conviction category, possible 
differences in the effect of time to disposition across modes of conviction were examined using cross-
product interaction terms. Consistent with the main analysis, the time to disposition × bench trial and time 




significantly across modes of conviction. For jury trials, gender exerts a large effect, for 
bench trials the effect declines in magnitude but remains significant, and for guilty pleas 
it reduces to non-significance. Similarly, Black and Hispanic race/ethnicity have larger 
influences on sentence severity for trials compared to guilty pleas, but differences in the 
size of their effects across modes of conviction are not statistically significant. Mode of 
conviction appears to condition the effect of court context as well. All of the other seven 
circuits are more punitive than the Eighth Circuit when it comes to guilty pleas and bench 
trials; however, for jury trials, many circuits are actually more lenient than the Eighth 
Circuit. Collectively, these results provide further support for Johnson’s (2003) 
conclusion that there are important differences in the effects of both legal and extralegal 
variables across modes of conviction. 
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Table 5.  Tobit Regression Models of Sentence Severity, Individual Modes of Conviction 
 Guilty Pleas  Bench and Jury Trials  Bench Trials  Jury Trials 
 β S.E. SD(β)  β S.E. SD(B)  β S.E. SD(B)  β S.E. SD(B) 











Time to disposition 0.35 0.14 0.03*  0.91 0.30 0.04**  0.64 0.42 0.03  0.26 0.40 0.01 
Control Variables                
Legal                 
Guidelines sentence 
recommendation 
0.65 0.13 0.66*** 
 
0.98 0.04 0.81*** 
 
0.96 0.08 0.79*** 
 
0.96 0.04 0.82*** 
Offender Score 0.27 1.31 0.01  -0.39 0.85 -0.01  -1.35 0.82 -0.03†  -1.60 1.04 -0.03 
Drug offense -18.88 8.88 -0.14*  -22.43 4.65 -0.07***  -5.56 4.24 -0.03  -26.20 3.96 -0.07*** 
Property offense -7.71 3.73 -0.06*  -13.18 3.33 -0.03***  -0.71 3.66 -0.002  -21.58 5.15 -0.05*** 
Felony offense 9.92 4.82 0.07*  18.39 5.10 0.06***  2.19 2.88 0.01  33.80 6.08 0.10*** 
Mandatory minimum 
penalty 
18.15 3.33 0.02*** 
 
-27.81 8.61 -0.03** 
 
12.55 8.21 0.02 
 
-47.39 9.24 -0.06*** 
Extralegal                
Age -0.38 0.13 -0.06**  0.09 0.18 0.01  -0.04 0.15 -0.004  0.09 0.20 0.01 
Male 2.80 2.01 0.01  26.13 4.34 0.05***  18.97 5.10 0.06***  31.31 3.35 0.05*** 
Black 6.46 2.86 0.05*  14.85 4.33 0.05**  10.82 5.27 0.05*  10.20 5.69 0.03† 
Hispanic 9.63 5.89 0.02†  22.54 7.83 0.03**  11.35 7.18 0.02  20.21 8.66 0.02* 
Other race 28.20 12.91 0.04*  9.94 13.71 0.01  0.35 12.40 0.0004  12.96 22.95 0.01 
PSI report ordered 22.55 7.74 0.11**  1.93 5.45 0.01  1.05 4.33 0.01  9.37 5.00 0.03† 
Missing PSI report 1.40 4.41 0.01  2.28 2.69 0.004  10.69 5.14 0.03*  -5.42 7.25 -0.01 
Public defender 3.44 1.37 0.03*  9.26 3.57 0.03*  5.60 4.51 0.03  5.83 5.02 0.02 
Other representation 5.21 5.26 0.03  4.17 3.43 0.01  9.97 5.20 0.05†  3.35 2.68 0.01 
First Circuit 46.27 3.90 0.18***  27.53 2.18 0.06***  29.30 0.94 0.09***  19.58 2.85 0.04*** 
Second Circuit 30.94 5.00 0.09***  -1.86 3.39 -0.004  17.06 3.89 0.06***  -18.80 2.22 -0.03*** 
Third Circuit 20.10 5.56 0.11***  -2.83 2.22 -0.001  10.31 1.35 0.05***  7.24 2.21 0.01** 
Fourth Circuit 34.21 4.11 0.10***  10.84 2.65 0.02***  30.08 1.97 0.06***  -5.37 4.32 -0.01 
Fifth Circuit 20.41 5.02 0.12***  -3.63 2.15 -0.01†  7.00 2.58 0.02**  -2.41 1.75 -0.003 
Sixth Circuit 32.03 4.04 0.13***  -1.75 2.08 -0.003  14.00 3.52 0.03***  -19.53 2.66 -0.03*** 
Seventh Circuit 23.14 4.13 0.13***  -3.93 3.50 -0.01  7.66 4.57 0.03†  -17.40 3.67 -0.04*** 
                
Sigma 44.08 4.65   73.93 3.22   57.83 7.36   79.22 3.27  
N 1,525  2,898  1,256  1,642 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.  
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Table 6.  Comparisons of Model Coefficients across Modes of Conviction 
 Guilty Pleas vs. Trials Guilty Pleas vs. Bench Trials Guilty Pleas vs. Jury Trials Bench Trials vs. Jury Trials 
 Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Independent Variables     
Time to disposition -1.70† -0.66 0.20 0.65 
Control Variables     
Legal      
Guidelines sentence 
recommendation 
-2.49* -2.09* -2.30* 0.03 
Offender Score 0.42 1.05 1.12 0.19 
Drug offense 0.35 -1.35 0.75 3.56*** 
Property offense 1.09 -1.34 2.18* 3.31*** 
Felony offense -1.21 1.38 -3.08** -4.70*** 
Mandatory minimum 
penalty 
4.98*** 0.63 6.67*** 4.85*** 
Extralegal     
Age -4.88*** -1.72† -2.00* -0.56 
Male -1.62 -2.95** -7.30*** -2.02* 
Black -1.32 -0.73 -0.59 0.08 
Hispanic 0.97 -0.19 -1.01 -0.79 
Other race 2.18* 1.56 0.58 -0.48 
PSI report ordered -0.17 2.42* 1.43 -1.26 
Missing PSI report -1.52 -1.37 0.80 1.81† 
Public defender 0.17 -0.46 -0.46 -0.03 
Other representation 4.20*** -0.64 0.32 1.13 
First Circuit 5.43*** 4.23*** 5.53*** 3.24** 
Second Circuit 3.83*** 2.19* 9.10*** 8.01*** 
Third Circuit 4.77*** 1.71† 2.15* 1.19 
Fourth Circuit 4.40*** 0.91 6.63*** 7.46*** 
Fifth Circuit 7.44*** 2.38* 4.29*** 3.01** 
Sixth Circuit 5.00*** 3.37*** 10.67*** 7.60*** 
Seventh Circuit -4.88*** 2.51* 7.34*** 4.27*** 
†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
 Time, or processing speed, is implicit and instrumental in many interpretations of 
sentencing. The organizational efficiency theoretical perspective of court actor behavior 
emphasizes timely case disposition as a shared goal of prosecutors, judges, and defense 
counsel, such that cooperative case processing strategies develop with this end in mind. 
In this way, time is also central to explanations of the trial penalty, as scholars and 
practitioners alike have attributed the harsher sentencing of trial-convicted offenders to 
the greater organizational cost associated with trials. The present study set out to provide 
empirical verification of these propositions by examining the relationship between time 
to disposition, mode of conviction, and sentence severity among a broad sample of 
offenders.  
 The results of this study showed mixed support for its hypotheses. Consistent with 
most sentencing research, strong, significant effects were found for bench trial conviction 
and jury trial conviction on sentence severity. Also as expected, conviction by jury trial 
exerted a greater effect on sentence severity than conviction by bench trial. While overall, 
findings from research comparing bench trials with jury trials are inconsistent, this 
particular result lends additional support to studies that have examined sentencing in 
Maryland specifically, which have more reliably reported harsher sentences for jury trials 
than for bench trials. This finding, together with research by King et al. (2005) and 
Souryal and Wellford (1997), suggests that in Maryland, bench trials and jury trials 
represent substantively different processes. Consequently, as has been argued by Johnson 
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(2003) and LaFree (1985), separation of bench trials and jury trials in future examinations 
of sentencing is warranted.  
 It was also hypothesized that time to disposition would positively impact sentence 
severity independent of the mode of conviction. This expectation was supported by the 
analysis, with longer case processing times being associated with more severe sentences 
for offenders. The significant effect of time to disposition in the present study suggests 
that the punishment meted out in a case may be at least to some extent a function of the 
organizational cost incurred in processing and disposing of that case, which lends 
credence to the organizational efficiency perspective. It may be that court actors seek to 
penalize offenders whose cases take up more of the court’s time and resources as a way 
of promoting the smooth progression of cases through the system. Importantly, this 
finding mirrors prior research by Bradley-Engen et al. (2012), which reported a 
significant, positive effect of time to disposition for offenders sentenced in the federal 
district courts for crimes identified in connection with terrorism investigations. The fact 
that similar results were found in research examining different groups of offenders in 
different court systems preliminarily indicates that like the trial penalty, this practice may 
be widespread, though additional studies conducted in new contexts with different types 
of offenders are needed to confirm this.   
Unexpectedly, controlling for time to disposition resulted in little to no 
appreciable change in the effects of bench trial conviction and jury trial conviction on 
sentence severity. Time did not mediate the influence of mode of conviction, as offenders 
who went to trial and were convicted (either by a judge or a jury) received harsher 
sentences, regardless of the amount of time invested in securing the conviction. This 
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finding can be interpreted in one of two ways. The first possibility is that from the 
organizational efficiency perspective, time to disposition does not fully capture the 
organizational cost of a trial. As mentioned previously, the present study relied upon time 
to disposition as a proxy for the concept of organizational cost. Despite a strong 
theoretical justification for using time to disposition, it admittedly may be an imperfect 
measure of organizational cost. Indeed, additional factors such as the amount of effort 
invested by court actors, disruption to cooperative working relations, and introduction of 
uncertainty all likely contribute to the organizational cost of a trial, and appropriate 
measures of these will be needed for a more comprehensive assessment of the 
organizational efficiency explanation of trial penalties. 
An alternative possibility is that this result supports the substantive rationality 
interpretation of trial penalties. From this perspective, the persistent, strong effect of 
mode of conviction may reflect court actors’ attempts in producing individualized 
punishments that appropriately take into account the circumstances of the crime and the 
individual (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012). As Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson (2010) 
explain, conviction at trial likely triggers certain assessments about culpability and 
dangerousness, which may therefore explain the harsher sentencing of trial-convicted 
offenders. That time to disposition was not responsible for the effect of mode of 
conviction on sentence severity may suggest that trial penalties are the result of “bad 
facts” revealed during the course of a trial or the greater perceived blameworthiness that 
comes from refusing to admit guilt and accept responsibility for the crime (Ulmer and 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer, Eisenstein, and Johnson, 2010).  
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It is also important that the effects of bench trial conviction and jury trial 
conviction on sentence severity were both relatively unchanged by controlling for time to 
disposition, which may suggest that similar mechanisms underlie bench trial penalties 
and jury trial penalties. It is possible that compared to guilty pleas, bench trials and jury 
trials allow for more negative information to be revealed or communicate a lack of 
remorsefulness on the part of the offender. In this regard, the harsher sentences observed 
for jury trials compared to bench trials may be the result of a common process, just to a 
different degree. That is, bench trial conviction may result in less of a penalty for 
offenders than jury trial conviction because the opportunity for disparaging facts to come 
out is more limited, which is supported by Ulmer’s (1997: 98) observation that judges 
and defense attorneys in Pennsylvania noted that jury trials especially risked disclosure of 
ugly facts about the case and the defendant. Similarly, even when bench trials serve as 
slow pleas, the offender technically pleads not guilty, which the judge may view 
unfavorably. Of course, without additional, more nuanced ways of tapping court actors’ 
assessments of culpability and dangerousness, this remains purely conjecture. At the very 
least, however, the findings imply that efficiency concerns are not differentially 
responsible for bench and jury trial penalties. 
Finally, in line with prediction, this study found that time to disposition had a 
significantly greater effect on sentence severity for trials than for guilty pleas. Although 
taking up more of the court’s time leads to increases in sentence severity even if 
offenders plead guilty, the greatest impact is on those convicted at trial. This finding 
further supports the organizational efficiency perspective as well as previous arguments 
by Flemming, Nardulli, and Eisenstein (1987) and Zatz and Lizotte (1985) that time spent 
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in trial is costlier to court actors. It also parallels Bradley-Engen et al.’s (2012) reported 
positive interaction effect between time to disposition and trial conviction. While the 
desire to conserve resources may lead court actors to reward early pleading defendants 
with more lenient sentences, the greater costs associated with trials may produce a larger 
incentive for court actors to secure a return on their investments as time goes on 
(Bradley-Engen et al., 2012).  
Another framework for interpreting this result is that proposed by Johnson (2003). 
He argued that different modes of conviction likely reflect the differential exercise of 
discretion by different court actors, which influences the extent to which certain factors 
affect sentencing outcomes. In contrast to guilty pleas, which involve considerable 
prosecutorial discretion, bench trials and jury trials involve greater discretion on the part 
of judges (Johnson, 2003). According to this line of reasoning, the greater effect of time 
to disposition for trials compared to guilty pleas possibly suggests that efficiency is a 
more salient concern for judges than it is for prosecutors.  
Limitations and Future Directions for Research 
 This study has some consequential limitations. Although the Maryland Sentencing 
Guidelines Database offered several unique advantages for investigating the effects of 
time to disposition and mode of conviction on sentence severity, it is also subject to many 
of the problems common to official data. First, the Database lacks information on earlier 
case processing outcomes, most notably, the pretrial status of offenders.23 As a 
consequence, there is a potential confound between time to disposition and sentence 
                                                          
23 Although the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database contains information on the amount of credit 
given for time served in pretrial detention, this is not a reliable indicator of whether the offender was 




severity that cannot be accounted for in this instance. It is possible that, especially for 
those cases with a large amount of time between the indictment filing and sentencing, 
increases in time to disposition are due to the offender’s failure to appear while on 
pretrial release. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007) estimated that a bench warrant for 
failure to appear in court was issued for 23% of released felony defendants in state courts 
in the 75 largest counties in the United States between 1990 and 2004, with about 6% of 
defendants released pretrial remaining a fugitive after one year. The more severe 
sentences observed for offenders with longer case processing times may therefore reflect 
to some degree punishment for fleeing justice rather than for taking up the court’s time 
and resources. While the present study aimed to mitigate this issue by top-coding cases 
with the longest disposition times, being able to control for failures to appear would have 
led to greater confidence in the accuracy of the estimated effect of time to disposition.  
A related issue in assessing the influence of time to disposition is that the 
Database only includes information on cases that were transferred from district court to 
circuit court upon request for a jury trial (also known as “jury trial prayers”) if a PSI 
report was ordered. Although information is not available on the frequency with which 
PSI reports are ordered, jury trial prayers accounted for approximately 44% of criminal 
cases in the Maryland circuit courts in Fiscal Year 2013, and thus they likely represent a 
significant portion of the criminal caseload (Administrative Office of the Courts, 2014). 
Capturing all jury trial prayers is important, as these cases are directly relevant to the 
current topic of investigation. In particular, practitioners have indicated that jury trial 
prayers in Maryland often reflect instances of “judge shopping,” where the defendant 
requests a jury trial in order to have the case transferred out of district court and to a 
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different judge. The strategy of judge shopping, with the accompanying court delay that it 
incurs, likely represents a drain on organizational resources that prosecutors and judges 
may recognize and seek to penalize accordingly. Thus, examining all jury trial prayers, 
and not merely the most serious or complex cases in which a PSI was ordered, has the 
potential to provide a better understanding of the way in which the organizational cost of 
a case serves to influence its outcome.     
 Another limitation of the present study concerns the omission of variables that 
are necessary for more completely evaluating the organizational efficiency and 
substantive rationality interpretations of the trial penalty. As discussed above, it is 
possible that time to disposition does not fully capture the organizational cost of a case, 
and that indicators of court resources other than time could be used to tap this important 
concept. In addition, particularly salient for the substantive rationality explanation of the 
trial penalty are direct measures of offender culpability and dangerousness, which 
scholars such as Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn (2007) have argued are lacking in 
sentencing research in general. While this study effectively tested the substantive 
rationality explanation of the trial penalty by default, explicitly incorporating 
operationalizations of this perspective would allow for a stronger examination of its 
merits. One relevant factor, for example, is a measure of judges’ exposure to negative 
information about the offender. Again, at present doing so is prevented by using official 
data (Wellford, 2007), and addressing this issue must be a task for future research.   
Finally, the analysis in the current study was restricted to convicted offenders. It 
did not control for the possibility of conviction or acquittal, and therefore estimates of the 
effects of certain variables may be subject to bias. Specifically, the influence of mode of 
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conviction on sentencing may be exaggerated for all prosecuted offenders, since LaFree 
(1985), Rhodes (1979), and Smith (1986) showed that accounting for the probability of 
acquittal substantially diminished the size of the trial penalty. On the other hand, 
Albonetti (1991) and Zatz and Hagan (1985) found that failing to control for the 
likelihood of conviction underestimated mode of conviction effects. Moreover, selection 
issues may be less of a concern for time to disposition, since Zatz and Hagan (1985) 
additionally determined that the effect of processing time on sentencing remained the 
same regardless of the case processing stage (prosecution, conviction, or incarceration) 
from which the sample was drawn. Even so, the results from this study provide valuable 
information about the roles played by mode of conviction and time to disposition once 
offenders are convicted and sentenced.  
Despite the foregoing limitations, the present study makes unique contributions to 
the field of sentencing. It represents an attempt to advance the theoretical understanding 
of trial penalties and the sentencing process in general. It also focuses attention on time as 
an important aspect of case processing. The effect of time to disposition on sentence 
severity was similar in magnitude to that of many of the other extralegal variables 
included in the analysis, including gender, race/ethnicity, type of representation, and 
jurisdiction. This highlights the shortcomings of prior work that fails to take time to 
disposition into account and underscores the necessity of including more case processing 
measures such as time into future studies of sentencing disparity. Furthermore, as a 
common metric of court performance, the connection between time to disposition and 
sentencing outcomes demonstrated by this study gives additional weight to a factor that is 
already a significant focus of policy-makers.  
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Several directions exist for future research to refine and further knowledge on the 
impact of time on sentencing. The most apparent next step for research is to examine the 
effect of time to disposition within a multilevel framework that accounts for multiple, 
overlapping influences in sentencing. This is important not only because prior work by 
Ulmer and Johnson (2004) has demonstrated that many individual-level characteristics 
have varying effects on sentencing outcomes across different social contexts, but also 
because the influence of social contexts is an integral part of the organizational efficiency 
perspective that provides the theoretical basis for the present line of inquiry. Nardulli 
(1978) explains that the courtroom elite’s efforts to pursue its common interest in 
efficient case processing are manifested differently in different settings, due to the effect 
of external constraints. These external constraints include the amount of control and 
supervision over court actors by sponsoring organizations, the local political climate, the 
media, as well as many others (Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977). As evidence of this, Dixon 
(1995) found that case processing variables only exerted significant effects on sentencing 
in counties with high judicial and prosecutorial bureaucratization. It would therefore 
make sense for research to study variation in the effect of time to disposition according to 
certain court contextual features. For example, high caseload pressure and limited 
financial resources of courts are likely to make efficiency a greater concern for court 
actors, which may result in time to disposition having a larger effect on sentencing 
outcomes in jurisdictions with these characteristics.  
Relatedly, research could also investigate conditional relationships between time 
to disposition and other individual-level predictors. A prominent theme in the extant 
work on sentencing is that extralegal factors condition one another as well as are 
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conditioned by legal factors (Ulmer, 2012). With this in mind, a possibility for future 
studies is to examine differences in the effect of time to disposition on sentencing by 
offender race/ethnicity and gender. Given that some prior research has reported more 
severe trial penalties for minorities (e.g., Steen, Engen, and Gainey, 2005; Steffensmeier 
and Demuth, 2000; Zatz, 1984), for instance, it is reasonable that there might be similar 
racial/ethnic or gender disparities in the influence of time to disposition. Offense 
characteristics may also condition the effect of time to disposition. Ulmer, Eisenstein, and 
Johnson (2010) note how court actors distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” 
trials, accepting penalties for defendants who go to trial without a valid reason for doing 
so. In much the same way, court actors may differentiate between warranted and 
unwarranted uses of court time, perhaps recognizing that more complex cases or those 
involving important legal issues are worthy of increased court resources. Accordingly, 
increases in disposition time might be penalized more severely for simple, 
straightforward drug cases, for example, than for serious cases involving offenses against 
a person.  
Lastly, future research should attempt to replicate this analysis with cases 
involving multiple criminal offenses. In the present study, the sample was limited to 
single-count cases in order to avoid additional complications arising from the analysis of 
multiple-count cases. While a comparison of single-count and multiple-count cases 
indicated that there were few substantial differences between them, not surprisingly 
multiple-count cases had higher guidelines sentence recommendations and longer lengths 
of incarceration than single-count cases, which suggest that the former represent more 
serious cases. It is also possible that multiple-count cases differ from single-count cases 
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on factors that were not examined, or that different substantive processes are at work in 
sentencing multiple-count cases. Ulmer and Bradley (2006) argue that for serious violent 
cases, organizational factors are less likely to be a dominant concern in sentencing, given 
that the stakes are higher for all parties and that these cases are often subject to greater 
media and public scrutiny. Although the researchers were referring specifically to trial 
penalties, their logic can just as well be applied to the influence of processing time. These 
possible distinctions therefore warrant separate investigation of multiple-count cases. The 
hope is that the present study encourages this kind of additional research in order to gain 
a more complete understanding of the effect of time to disposition and the larger role that 




















Appendix B.  Maryland Circuit Courts by Judicial Circuit 
1st Judicial Circuit 
Dorchester, Somerset, Wicomico, and Worcester counties 
 
2nd Judicial Circuit 
Caroline, Cecil, Kent, Queen Anne’s, and Talbot counties 
 
3rd Judicial Circuit 
Baltimore and Harford counties 
 
4th Judicial Circuit 
Allegany, Garrett, and Washington counties 
 
5th Judicial Circuit 
Anne Arundel, Carroll, and Howard counties 
 
6th Judicial Circuit 
Frederick and Montgomery counties 
 
7th Judicial Circuit 
Calvert, Charles, Prince George’s, and St. Mary’s counties 
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